Change of location

For anyone who might have been following the debate I was having on triablogue here:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/11/arminian-perspectives.html

and more recently here:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/11/libertarian-free-will-and-total.html

The venue has moved to turretinfan's site, as he seems to be the main person responding at this point.

Here's his site:

http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2007/11/quick-response-to-godismyjudge.html

and my most recent response:


Dear TF,

I am glad we can agree that divided senses shift as the topic shifts. I wonder if “ability to choose freely” could have a divided sense, but maybe it can. My concern is if it could have one, would that divided sense be of any use to you? One of the reasons I wonder this is because compatiblism and division seem at odds. That’s why I have been asking you (and Gene and Sinner Saint) for one. So I will gladly take you up on your offer to elaborate, using my necessary/sufficient distinction or anything else you would like.

BTW, I think “ability” can have a divided sense, but I don’t think it always has to have one. Further, a divided sense is more so about the scope of the context than the definition of the term.

As for God being freely good, I don’t think He is freely good. What He does is good, and what He does, He does freely. Responsibility has to do with being the source of ones actions whether they be bad (in the case of the totally depraved person) or good (in God’s case).

For more see:

Arminius Article 22:


http://www.godrules.net/library/arminius/arminius17.htm

And this argument from Freddoso in which he defends the compatibility of God’s maximal power and maximal goodness.

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/mp.htm

May are maximally powerful and good Father grant you peace,
Dan

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