Dan Chapa

Certainty properly is not an affection of an existing thing or of one about to happen, but of the mind certainly knowing or foreknowing that the thing exists or is about to exist: whence a transference is made to the event, -for it is the same that a thing will happen, and that it will certainly happen, -but that it may be signified to another that there is no reason to doubt of the event coming to pass. But necessity is an affection of the being, and adds a mode to the event, by which it is said that a thing will happen necessarily, and is opposed to the mode which is called "contingency". Therefore the same idea is not expressed, when it is said that a thing will happen certainly and necessarily; for the one word is only about futurition, the other about the mode also of futurition. This necessity is that of the consequent, by which a thing exists from its antecedent beginning and cause, so that it cannot not-exist from it: to which is opposed the contingency of the consequ

However, the action itself must not be counted among the things that are necessary for acting. This is evident per se, since otherwise one would not be asserting anything special about the causes under discussion; instead, one wold be making a claim that to all things - not only to all agents but to all entities as well- namely, that if they have a form whereby they are constituted with such and such an esse or under such an such a notion, then the consequent that they are of that sort follows necessarily. For just as if someone has whiteness, then he is necessarily white, so too if someone exercises an action, then he necessarily effects something-where this is merely the necessity of the consequence (as they say): that is, a conditioned necessity, and not the necessity of the consequent-that is, an absolute necessity. The former kind of necessity is irrelevant in the present context, since causes cannot be distinguished with respect to it. 1 Therefore, in order for the discussion to

“When addressing the question of whether it is within one’s power to prevent some future event, it is important to keep clear that the distinction between the sensus divisus and the sensus composites. In sensu composito I cannot prevent a future event, for this is self-contradictory. But in sensu diviso I can prevent some future event, for I have contra-causal power to bring about future events. Similarly it is not within one’s power to postvent a past event in sensu composito because this is self-contaditory. Since backward causation is metaphysically impossible, we do not generally have it within our power to affect the past even is sensu division, thus generating our intuitions of the unalterability of the past as over against the future. But where what is past is conditioned by what is future (for example, future contingent propositions’ being antecedently true), I have the power to act in such a way that the past would have been different than it in fact was. (Craig. Divine Forekn

“The second error has to do with the composed sense, namely, we should not claim that because the divine foreknowledge already exists beforehand, Peter is in reality not able not to sin, as if because of the preesisting divine knowledge he has lost something of his freedom and power not to sin in reality, should he so will. For I would not hesitate to call this sort of interpretation an error from the point of view of the faith. Indeed, even though that knowledge did exist beforehand, it was just as truly within his power not to sin as it would have been had that knowledge not existed, and he was just as truly able to refrain from the act in light of which he was foreknown to be a future sinner as he would have been had that knowledge not existed, as has been explained; thus this interpretation is not the one that the theologians have in mind. Rather, they are claiming, absolutely correctly, that given the divine foreknowledge, Peter is not able in the composed sense not to sin, becaus

Moreover, for an understanding of the objections it must be noted, that there is a twofold necessity, namely, the absolute, and the respective. An absolute necessity, which is opposed to contingency, is said (to be) the necessity of the consequent. A respective necessity is said (to be) the necessity of the consequence, and this is not opposed to the contingent. For something contingent necessarily follows, so that if one walks, it necessarily follows, that he moves. It must be said, therefore, that in the foreknown there is no absolute necessity, but only (a necessity) of consequence, because there necessarily follows: ‘God foreknows this, therefore this will be’.... 4. To that which is objected per impossibile, that if it could be otherwise, It could fail; it must be said, that1 falsehood [falsitas] comes from the discord of an intellect regarding the cognized, similarly the potency to fail [potential fallendi] from the potency to be discordant [potential discordandi]. Therefore, I s

In Steve Hays' response to William Lane Craig ( here ), he raised some arguments against Molinism, which I have been attempting to address. This post is a continuation of our exchange. So the Molinist God instantiates a sinful world even though he hates sin, and sin is unnecessary. Doesn’t sound very coherent to me. Much less a promising theodicy. It’s no contradiction or incoherence to permit something you hate, so long as you have good reason to do so. I suppose one could read a contradiction into this by understanding 'instantiates' in some way that denies or undermines LFW. Yes, God is willing to permit sin to obtain the greater good. What’s the theodicean value of the adjective (“ultimately”) in relation to the noun (“sin”)? How does the adjective magically exculpate God on Molinist grounds? On Molinist grounds, ultimate responsibility is essential to moral culpability. Sometimes people are responsible for the downstream consequences of what they do when they are ulti

But regarding that, which has been said above, namely that God’s Foreknowledge cannot fail, it was customarily opposed by certain (authors) in this manner: God foreknew this one (was) going to read, and/or something of this kind; but it can be, that he does not read: therefore it can be otherwise than God foreknew, therefore God’s foreknowledge can fail. — Which is entirely false. Of course it can (be) that something does not come to be, and yet that it has been foreknown to come to be; yet for this reason God’s Foreknowledge cannot fail, because if that were not to come to be, neither would it have been foreknown by God to come to be. But they still urge the question saying: either it can come to be [fieri] otherwise, than God has foreknown, or not otherwise; if not otherwise: therefore necessarily all shall turn out (as God foreknows it) [cuncta eveniunt]; if, however, otherwise: therefore God’s Foreknowledge can fail and/or be changed. But it can come to be otherwise, because it can

As an Arminian and Molinist, I specifically oppose all forms of causal determinism. If there’s one aspect of Calvinism I object to, it’s causal determinism. Yet some Calvinists are hesitant to say they are causal determinists. This post is to lay out the various forms of causal determinism; Naturalism, Occationalism, Concurrence and Mainline Calvinist Causal Determinism; all of which I oppose. Naturalism Based on knowledge derived from the physical and social sciences, the world view that is naturalism holds that human beings are fully included in nature. Science tells us that we are connected and united, in each and every aspect of our being, to the natural world. There is, under naturalism, nothing supernatural about us which places us above or beyond nature, but this is something to be celebrated, not feared. Practically speaking, naturalism holds that an individual’s development and behavior are entirely the result of prior and surrounding conditions, both genetic and environmental