Posts

Showing posts from March, 2009

Church Fathers on Foreknowledge and Freewill

Some Calvinists suggest that God's foreknowledge is based on His plan and/or knowledge of causal relations rather then based on the future. I thought I would look up what the church fathers had to say on the subject of God's foreknowledge and freewill. Here are the results. Diodore of Tarsus (circa 390) This text [Romans 8:29-30] does not take away our free will. It uses the word foreknew before predestined. Not it is clear that foreknowledge does not by itself impose any particular behavior. What is said here would be clearer if we started from the end and worked backwards. Whom did God glorify? Those whom he justified. Whom did he predestine? Those whom he foreknew, who were called according to his plan, i.e., who demonstrated that they were worthy to be called by his plan and made conformable to Christ. (Romans (Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture. New Testament, volume 6. Edited by Thomas Oden. P 235) Ambrosiaster (late 4th century) Those whom God foreknew would bel

Determinism and Determinists

Steve has responded in our ongoing discussion on choice and determinism. Steve: I’ve been busy with more important business, such as my review of Ehrman’s silly new book. Thanks for responding to Ehrman's blasphemies. Steve: Moreover, I’ve already corrected him on his misstatement that determinism rules out possible alternatives. That’s demonstrably false. In supralapsarian Calvinism, for example, God chose a particular means to achieve a particular end. There were other possible ends, with corresponding means available to him, but he chooses the end that best furthers his purpose (i.e. the glorification of God in the glorification of the elect). Determinism does rule out possible alternatives. Calvinism isn't equivalant to determinism. Granted some Calvinists hold to exhaustive determinism - the ones who deny God's LFW. But Calvinists who affirm God's LFW deny exhaustive determinism. Granted, for these Calvinists, God not man has LFW. But to the extent that God has LF

Book Review: Whedon's Freedom of the Will

John Wagner recently edited and republished Daniel Whedon’s Freedom of the Will: A Wesleyan response to Jonathan Edwards . The book is an outstanding refutation of Edward’s Inquiry into the Will. Whedon seeks and engages top authors and arguments like Hobbs’ argument (latter adopted by Locke and Edwards) that free will is incoherent, because it either amounts to a causeless cause or infinite regression of causes. Whedon responds by pointing out 1) the will is the cause of choice (74), 2) defining indeterministic causes (38-39) and 3) explaining that indeterministic causes account for either choice (71-72). In other words, indeterministic causes explain the goal of our choices (or reason for our choices), but in the will is the cause we choose this goal, not that goal. This is essentially agent causation. Whedon’s discussion of foreknowledge is fascinating. His refutation of Edwards' God's foreknowledge rules out freewill argument is solid. I like his pointing out that we

What if chocolate is sold out?

Steve provided a response in our ongoing discussion of choice and determinism. For the most part, I agree with Steve's explanation of how dictionaries/lexicons work and only resist his characterizing my position as falling outside the parameters he so skillfully lays down. Paul and I reviewed 9 dictionary definitions of "choose". 8 of them use either "alternative" or "possible" or both within the definition. Wiktionary did not; it used synonyms (including "decide"). I cited this as a failing on the part of the Wiktionary and argued that the definitions provided in the other 8 dictionaries ruled out determinism. So my contention is that the question of why dictionaries and lexicons are what they are is not relevant to the business at hand. The questions should be: “what does the dictionary say” and “does that conflict with determinism”? Since dictionaries speak of possible alternatives and determinism rules out possible alternatives, it see

Friday Files: Keith Schooley on Romans 9

In Keith Schooley's Article: Romans 9: An Arminian/New Perspective Reading, he skillfully uses the OT to explain Romans 9. Paul refutes " those Jews who would say that, if Paul’s gospel were correct, then “God’s word had failed” ( 9:6 ). His response to them is that God had never made the unconditional promises, based either on “works” or ethnicity, that they were claiming. God sovereignly chose Isaac over Ishmael; He sovereignly chose Jacob over Esau; and by implication, He can sovereignly choose on the basis of faith in Christ, as opposed to works of the law or ethnicity." Keith has an interesting take on hardening. Since both Pharaoh and God are said to harden Pharaoh's heart, Keith sees various roles in the hardening process. God provides the impetus for harding and Pharaoh responds by hardening his heart. Regerading the objector in Romans 9:19, Keith explains the objection as " the questioner is asking why faith in Christ should be necessary. That