Compatiblistic Agent Causation
Recently, a poster named Remonstrant shared a few sites arguing for compatiblistic determinism and asked me whether I thought compatiblism was mutually exclusive with Arminianism. I would like to address this in two parts. First, I wanted to provide some comments on the article then answer the question of how the view squares with Arminianism.
This article by Ned Markosian was the longest and most in depth:
http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/nmarkos/Papers/Comtac.pdf
In it Ned advocates for a view in which Agent Causation and Compatible Determinism co-exist. Ned argues that 1) Compatible Determinism is the best way of explaining Agent Causation, as it resolves various issues with indeterministic Agent Causation and 2) Agent Causation (even if Compatiblistic) is sufficient to explain moral responsibility.
My take…
Ned proposes various definitions of Agent Causation, all of which fail in one aspect or another. But Ned’s point is that agent causation is compatible with compatible determinism. This is why the definitions he provides fail. He didn’t provide a definition which entails indeterminism. Here’s one: The event is caused by the agent and nothing outside the agent necessitates the agent’s causing the event. This definition is relatively simple and works under all the scenarios Ned provides.
So I disagree that compatible determinism is compatible with Agent Causation. In fact, the beauty of Agent Causation is that it states inderministic causation in positive, not negative, terms. What I mean is that indeterminism states that the sum total of prior causes does not necessitate the event. This is a statement of what does not take place. This is helpful, but definitions are about what things are not what they are not. Agent Causation simply points to the source, the Agent, to the exclusion of all other sources. So Agent Causation states positively what indeterministic causation states negatively. What Ned is talking about is something else, and shouldn’t be called Agent Causation so as not to lead to confusion and equivocation.
This is the primary problem I have with Ned’s article, or at least his critique of indeterminisic Agent Causation. It misdefines Agent Causation in order to get it to fit in with Compatible Determinism.
The other point of the article is that this new theory of Agent Causation (I wish he would use a different term) which fits with compatible determinism provides a reasonable explanation of responsibility. Here I disagree as well.
I have two objections. First, (similar to the objection above) the causation described is not Agent Causation, rather it’s event causation. Second, it does not explain responsibility.
If people react deterministically based on their nature at the time, their actions happen via a chain of events. What’s the difference between this and an eight ball's motion being determined by the combination of its location and the strike of the cue? Yes, people's personalities can change over time, but so can the location of the eight ball. Both are acted upon and react out of their nature. This is event causation.
As for responsibility, Ned himself admits his theory yields surprising results (ie a man whose nature is altered by aliens such that he can’t avoid killing is still responsible). Is such a man responsible? I don’t think so, but let’s suppose he was. Wouldn’t we also still want to trace responsibility back to the aliens as well? So this theory isn’t helpful with the problem of evil. It has the same problem all compatiblistic determinism has. We want to track things back to the source to find responsibility.
Dan
This article by Ned Markosian was the longest and most in depth:
http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/nmarkos/Papers/Comtac.pdf
In it Ned advocates for a view in which Agent Causation and Compatible Determinism co-exist. Ned argues that 1) Compatible Determinism is the best way of explaining Agent Causation, as it resolves various issues with indeterministic Agent Causation and 2) Agent Causation (even if Compatiblistic) is sufficient to explain moral responsibility.
My take…
Ned proposes various definitions of Agent Causation, all of which fail in one aspect or another. But Ned’s point is that agent causation is compatible with compatible determinism. This is why the definitions he provides fail. He didn’t provide a definition which entails indeterminism. Here’s one: The event is caused by the agent and nothing outside the agent necessitates the agent’s causing the event. This definition is relatively simple and works under all the scenarios Ned provides.
So I disagree that compatible determinism is compatible with Agent Causation. In fact, the beauty of Agent Causation is that it states inderministic causation in positive, not negative, terms. What I mean is that indeterminism states that the sum total of prior causes does not necessitate the event. This is a statement of what does not take place. This is helpful, but definitions are about what things are not what they are not. Agent Causation simply points to the source, the Agent, to the exclusion of all other sources. So Agent Causation states positively what indeterministic causation states negatively. What Ned is talking about is something else, and shouldn’t be called Agent Causation so as not to lead to confusion and equivocation.
This is the primary problem I have with Ned’s article, or at least his critique of indeterminisic Agent Causation. It misdefines Agent Causation in order to get it to fit in with Compatible Determinism.
The other point of the article is that this new theory of Agent Causation (I wish he would use a different term) which fits with compatible determinism provides a reasonable explanation of responsibility. Here I disagree as well.
I have two objections. First, (similar to the objection above) the causation described is not Agent Causation, rather it’s event causation. Second, it does not explain responsibility.
If people react deterministically based on their nature at the time, their actions happen via a chain of events. What’s the difference between this and an eight ball's motion being determined by the combination of its location and the strike of the cue? Yes, people's personalities can change over time, but so can the location of the eight ball. Both are acted upon and react out of their nature. This is event causation.
As for responsibility, Ned himself admits his theory yields surprising results (ie a man whose nature is altered by aliens such that he can’t avoid killing is still responsible). Is such a man responsible? I don’t think so, but let’s suppose he was. Wouldn’t we also still want to trace responsibility back to the aliens as well? So this theory isn’t helpful with the problem of evil. It has the same problem all compatiblistic determinism has. We want to track things back to the source to find responsibility.
Dan
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