Dan Chapa

Turretinfan argued for determinism ( here ) to which I responded ( here ) and he has again responded ( here ). I had argued: "The first verse in scripture claims that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. ( Genesis 1:1 ) We either understand this by faith, or we do not. ( Hebrews 11:3 ) Consider God’s first action. By definition, no act of God preceded that first act. So no causes preceded that action. Rather, God self-determined that action, by performing it. Thus, contrary to Calvinism, self-determining power exists." TF responded: This argument is obviously fallacious, because it conflates "cause" with "action." Although there was no action before Creation, nevertheless God's nature and counsel, being eternal, preceded the first action. Scripture explicitly speaks of God's counsel existing "before the foundation of the Earth." (Ephesians 1:4 According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world,

Outline of Edwards’ Arguments in Part III.IV Commands inconsistent with LFW God commands the acts of the will, not the acts of body executing the will’s commands. If there’s a sequence of acts of the will, the first act that drives the train is the one God’s commands pertain to. Whatever comes before that first act of the will isn ’t the subject of the command. But some Arminians say the act of the soul determines the act of the will. So that act of the soul isn ’t subject to divine commands. Other Arminians say nothing causes the acts of the will, but then they happen by accident and pure chance. And if they happen by pure chance, there’s no point to God regulating them with a law. Inability and Responsibility Disobedience implies a moral inability to obey, because some moral cause must have determined the sin’s occurrence Natural inability is incompatible with responsibility if the will complies with a command, but the body is hindered, the man is excused Natural inability c

In part 3, scections III.I , III.II , and III.III , Edwards argues against the link between LFW and responsibility by appealing to divine impeccability as well as judicial hardening. He argues if God cannot sin, and a hardened man cannot do good, neither has freewill. But God is still worthy of praise and the hardened sinner is still to blame. So praise and blame to not require freewill. The response is fairly straight forward. We agree that God cannot sin, and that sinners, without grace, cannot choose good. But does this mean that neither has LFW ? No. Recall that LFW does not mean the ability to choose between good and evil. ( link ) God chooses between good alternatives and sinners, without softening grace, choose between evil options. Divine Impeccability Imagine you dig $20 out of your couch cushion. With that $20 you could A) give it to church, or B) buy your mom flowers If you were impeccable, you could not C) buy drugs to get high. But you could still choose between th

Here's an audio file of a summary of Arminius' theology, in his own words. It's taken from his letter to Hippolytus A Collibus, but I omitted certain parts and paraphrased a few things. It covers the topics of Christ’s divinity, providence, predestination, grace & freewill and justification. Gabcast! Dan's blog #4 I. THE DIVINITY OF THE SON OF GOD. Concerning the divinity of the Son of God, I have taught, and still teach, that the Father has never been without his Word and his Spirit, but that the Word and the Spirit are not to be considered in the Father under the notion of properties, as wisdom, goodness, justice, or power, but under that of really existing persons, to whom it belongs to be, to live, to understand, to will, to be capable, and to do or act, all of which, when united, are indications and proofs of a person, but that they are so in the Father as to be also from the Father, in a certain order of origin, not through [co-laterality], to be ref

One of the many problems with the Calvinist arguments that LFW doesn’t exist is that if LFW doesn’t exist, God doesn’t have LFW. But scripture grants no quarter to those who claim that God doesn’t have LFW. The first verse in scripture claims that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. ( Genesis 1:1 ) We either understand this by faith, or we do not. ( Hebrews 11:3 ) Consider God’s first action. By definition, no act of God preceded that first act. So no causes preceded that action. Rather, God self-determined that action, by performing it. Thus, contrary to Calvinism, self-determining power exists. Now the Calvinist might object – how is this to be explained? Does it even make sense? But wait. The scripture says in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Atheists might doubt the existence of a first cause, but it is contrary to the faith to doubt that God created the world in the beginning. Perhaps the Calvinist might backpedal and say, yes God has self-d

In part 2 section 12, Edwards attempts three demonstrations of the incompatibility of LFW and God’s foreknowledge: 1) based on the connection between foreknowledge and the event, 2) based on the impossibility of knowing things without evidence and 3) based on knowing a contingent event with certainty. The Connection between Foreknowledge and the Event Edwards' Argument: P1: Things in the past are now necessary P2: In the past, God infallibly foreknew our future choices C1: therefore, God's foreknowledge of our future choices is now necessary P3: if something necessary is infallibly connected with something else, that something else is also necessary P4: God's necessary foreknowledge is infallibly connected with our future choices C2: therefore, our future choices are necessary My Response P3 is equivical. "Connection" could mean either a logical connection or a causal one. Additionally, "is" can mean either a logical or a temporal moment. If connec

Brief Outline of Edwards' Arguments in Part II of Freedom of the Will Edwards attacks LFW in two broad categories: causation and divine foreknowledge. Under causation, Edwards argues that LFW either leads to an infinite regression of causes or is an action without a cause. Edwards then argues that actions without causes are absurd because: 1) they would violate the common sense idea that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause, 2) then we wouldn’t be able to reason from cause to effect, 3) all proof of God’s existence is taken away, and 4) actions produced by a causeless cause would be both random and irrational, and therefore not a basis of moral accountability. Infinite Regression of Causes or Causeless Edwards first argues under LFW choices can't have causes. Asserting they do " brings us directly to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train, determining the rest; or a free act of the Will, before the first free ac