Edwards' Arguments against LFW
Edwards attacks LFW in two broad categories: causation and divine foreknowledge. Under causation, Edwards argues that LFW either leads to an infinite regression of causes or is an action without a cause. Edwards then argues that actions without causes are absurd because: 1) they would violate the common sense idea that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause, 2) then we wouldn’t be able to reason from cause to effect, 3) all proof of God’s existence is taken away, and 4) actions produced by a causeless cause would be both random and irrational, and therefore not a basis of moral accountability.
Infinite Regression of Causes or Causeless
Edwards first argues under LFW choices can't have causes. Asserting they do "brings us directly to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train, determining the rest; or a free act of the Will, before the first free act of the Will." If our choices have causes, either whatever causes our choices was causeless or it had a cause. And this argument repeats till we either reach something causeless or we continue with an infinite regression of causes.
My Response
The way Edwards defines causes our choices don't have causes, but the way I define causes, they do. I don't think Edwards defines cause correctly or consistently. In part II.III Edwards defines cause as : I sometimes use the word Cause, in this inquiry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an Event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise. In this sense our choices have causes. But in part II.VIII Edwards says: If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their causes, then it will follow, that there are some things which come to pass without any cause and also, if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause... this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been sufficient, it would have done it.
Choices have indeterministic causes, not sufficient causes. Indeterministic causation is a tricky subject, but there are a few things we can say about it. First off, indeterministic causes do not predetermine the effects. The effect may or may not happen given the presence of the indeterministic cause. So that's what indeterministic causes aren't, but what are they?Indeterministic causes:
- are necessary to produce effects - without the indeterministic cause the effect cannot happen
- produce desires within us. We desire more than one thing: I want to eat the cake and I want to lose weight. An indeterministic cause can give us the desire for something, without actually forcing the choice
- eliminate the "no choice" option - an indeterministic cause can force us to choose between two paths, as opposed to waiting at the Y intersection
- At times, a special subcategory of indeterministic causation can be sufficient to produce a choice, without opposition. That is to say, given the presence of the indeterministic cause and without our will specifically opposing that indeterministic cause, the choice will be produced.
#4 is rather abstract, so perhaps an example or two will help. One example of this is prevenient grace. If we do nothing, prevenient grace causes us to choose God. If we resist, we block prevenient grace. Think of two sumo wrestlers. If one stops pushing, the other causes him to go flying out of the ring. But if he continues pushing, he holds his ground. In the same way, this subcategory of indeterministic causation is sufficient without resistance and insufficient with resistance.
Another example, for guys, is looking at a beautiful woman. Christ says if we look for the purpose of lusting after her, we are committing adultery. So it's look and lust. But don't think that if a beautiful woman catches your eye you can continue looking without lusting. She's not just beautiful, she's attractive. If you don't quickly choose to look away, you will be caused to lust after her.
Of course, indeterministic causes don't predetermine outcomes. Our choices do not have sufficient causes. The agent is the source of his actions and his act of choosing is the first cause in a sufficient causation (rather than indeterminisic causation) sense. Edwards argues that everything has a sufficient cause, but we disagree.
It's true that most of what we observe in nature has a sufficient cause. For example, the strike of the cue ball is sufficient to sink the eight ball. This works in the physical world, although perhaps exceptions exist at the quantum level. But remember, the will isn't physical, it's part of your immaterial soul. If a mad scientist were to dissect me, he wouldn't find my will. The will can't be moved with respect to location, because it's not spatially extended. So LFW is not really an exception to physical causation.
The short answer to Edwards argument is that his equivocation of the word "cause" leads to a false dichotomy. This response also refutes Edwards' points #1 & 2.
All proof of God’s existence is taken away
In part II.III Edwards argues: If this grand principle of common sense [nothing ever comes to pass without a cause] be taken away, all arguing from effects to causes ceaseth, and so all knowledge of any existence, besides what we have by the most direct and immediate intuition, particularly all our proof of the being of God, ceases: we argue His being from our own being, and the being of other things, which we are sensible once were not, but have begun to be; and from the being of the world, with all its constituent parts, and the manner of their existence; all which we see plainly are not necessary in their own nature, and so not self-existent, and therefore must have a Cause. But if things, not in themselves necessary, may begin to be without a Cause, all this arguing is vain.
My Response
In the first place, the cosmological argument isn't the only argument for the existence of God. In my opinion, Anselm's ontological argument is stronger. In the second place, Edwards' idea that everything that came to pass has a cause actually disproves the biblical account of God. Consider God's first act, creation, as recorded in Genesis 1:1. Did creation have a preceding sufficient cause? If it did, it wasn't in the beginning. The cosmological argument relies on agent causation, which falsifies Edwards' premise that everything that comes to pass must have a sufficient cause. In the third place, Edwards' equivocation over the word "cause" reveals that every action of creation does in fact have a cause. And in the fourth place, God's providential concurrence reconciles the cosmological argument with LFW.
Actions produced by a causeless cause would be random and irrational, and therefore not a basis of moral accountability
In part II.XIII Edwards argues that if our choices don't have a cause, then reason isn't a cause of our choices. If reason isn't the cause of our choices, then we are choosing irrationally.
My Response
If we choose to act without considering the consequences, we are choosing irrationally. If we consider an action and our reason tells us that action is altogether bad, our reason eliminated that action as a possible option for us, and we can't choose it. If our reason either identifies some aspect of an action as good, or is uncertain as to the outcome, that action remains an option to us. In which case our reason tells us that multiple options have good aspects, or at least they could have good aspects. In which case, choosing either option would be rational.
Let's take the example of a milk shake and a diet. Our reason projects the milk shake will taste good and also that not having the milk shake help with weight loss. They both have some good aspects, so they remain options. If we choose either, we are acting in accordance with a plan, and our actions are rational.
Comments
But more to the point. I am not with you on prevenient grace (though perhaps I misunderstand it). Perhaps I am semi-pelagian :)
I think that God needs to draw us but he is wooing everyone. However we need to actively respond to that. A neutral response does not lead us to glory. We all are fallen and tend away from God.
But there can be no neutral response can there? We all must choose one way or another.
Since you think God has to draw us, I doubt your semi-Pelagian. My explanation of prevenient grace isn't the only Arminian one out there. Here's a post on the difference between semi-Pelagians and two different kinds of Arminians. link
As for an active response... I do think we respond. I just think God causes our response, in such a way that unless we make a choice to resist His causation, we are going to choose God. But resistance is a meta-choice. IE, it's not choosing to reject Christ, but rather choosing to resist the changes God is working in us that lead us to accept Christ.
But again, I don't claim to be the official Arminian spokesman on this point. There's more than one Arminian view.
As for a neutral response... No, I don't think there's a neutral response. This is where the meta-choice comes in. Let's take the upcoming election. Choosing a candidate implies a prior decision to vote. Perhaps if one has a difficult time picking a candidate, they might decide not to vote. I suppose in one sense they were neutral regarding choosing a candidate, but they chose not to vote. Similarly, when God teaches someone they are a sinner and need a savior, they can resist before they get to the decision of trusting in Christ or not.
God be with you,
Dan
Not sure if you will get back over to the Triablogue today, but after your last comment this is what I wrote-
When you write-
Normally, we ascribe the indeterminate cause as the reason. I.E. I thought choosing X, thought it would be good for Y and I valued Y…. Also, since our choice is for something contemplated, we wouldn’t say it was chance. But we can’t find a sufficient cause outside of ourselves.
Would not Y be an antecedent condition here that determined how you went about choosing? Also, if you were in the same circumstances (conditions, nature, knowledge, desire, etc.) would you not always pick X since you would think that would be good for Y and you value Y?
Would you not have to say that given same situation, rather than choosing X you would choose Z-even though you thought it would be good for Y if you pick X and you value Y, yet you still would pick Z?
That seems illogical and rather counter intuitive to me.
Praise be to God
BTW- not sure but if you would rather I interact with you over here; I would be more than happy to follow-up here with any further questions or discussions if that works better for you.
Very very good Edwards review, so far (I was busy with finals so i need to catch up with your materials here :)
Dear Mitch,
Would not Y be an antecedent condition here that determined how you went about choosing? Also, if you were in the same circumstances (conditions, nature, knowledge, desire, etc.) would you not always pick X since you would think that would be good for Y and you value Y?
Would you not have to say that given same situation, rather than choosing X you would choose Z-even though you thought it would be good for Y if you pick X and you value Y, yet you still would pick Z?
Actually that is the only way i see free will possible - ability to choose contrary to the influences.
Not that they dont affect the choice, but they dont absolutely determine it.
If the result of a choice was determined by a sum of influences (like conditions, nature, etc,) and the possibility of a different choice under the same conditions was excluded that would mean an absolute absence of free will(at least as i define it); but rather mean that the choice can be "orchestrated" so to speak by arranging the influences in a certain way,as in a lab experiment, so a person could and would react in a predicted way only.
That to me raises a problem with possibility of seeing a person only as a product of the environment and also with accountability issues.
What is your definition of free will if you dont mind to elaborate,please? How do you see it?
Thanks,
Odeliya
“Actually that is the only way I see free will possible - ability to choose contrary to the influences.
Not that they don’t affect the choice, but they don’t absolutely determine it.”
There are basically two very different views. The libertarian takes the position that our choices if they involve free will, are **non-necessitated** choices (i.e., I choose to do one thing when I also could have done another, either way I choose I did not **have to** do it). The other view, that of the compatibilist is that our choices involve necessitated choices (given the circumstances of the situation I have to do what I end up choosing to do).
Another way to describe it is that the libertarian claims that we **have** a choice and then **make** a choice. If all events are predetermined on the other hand then we never ever **have** a choice, we **only make choices** necessitated by some factor (which will differ according to whose version of compatibilism is being presented, for one the factor is our genes, for another it is our brain, for another it is antecedent conditions and the laws of nature, for another it is God’s decrees, for another it is our nature, etc. etc.).
When you speak of them not “absolutely determining” them I take that to mean they are not necessitated.
“If the result of a choice was determined by a sum of influences (like conditions, nature, etc,) and the possibility of a different choice under the same conditions was excluded that would mean an absolute absence of free will(at least as I define it); but rather mean that the choice can be "orchestrated" so to speak by arranging the influences in a certain way, as in a lab experiment, so a person could and would react in a predicted way only.”
Again, you are speaking of necessitated choices. Given certain conditions, then one specific outcome must happen by necessity.
“That to me raises a problem with possibility of seeing a person only as a product of the environment and also with accountability issues.”
When I was in college behaviorism dominated the psychology department. They taught that everything happens as a result of stimulus and response. Given a certain stimulus then a certain response must follow. Noam Chomsky wrote a devastating critique of B. F. Skinner who was the top dog of the determinists/behaviorists. That ended behaviorism wiped it out. Chomsky showed that language involves choices that we make in our minds, so mere external stimuli cannot account for our intentional actions when language is involved. After Chomsky’s essay that ended behaviorism’s dominance in the psychology departments. Chomsky has never been refuted and in fact if you consider your own language use, your language use is dominated by choices that you make, choices that are not necessitated by any other factors.
“What is your definition of free will if you don’t mind to elaborate, please? How do you see it?”
Determinists who believe that everything is predetermined by God, start with their assumption that God predetermines everything and then try to form a definition of “free will” that fits with the exhaustive determinism that they want to believe in. So they will argue that you make choices and that you do what you want to do. And they add that if you were not coerced or constrained in what you chose to do, then you had free will. This is a very warped and incomplete definition of free will. It is a definition developed to maintain an agenda, that everything is predetermined and so we can never do otherwise then we were predetermined to do. If we look around at our own daily experience as well as others it clearly appears that people sometimes have choices, they have free will in the sense that they could do one thing or another and their actions are not necessitated. If we look at scripture we find the same thing, that people had choices and then made choices from the alternatives which they had.
Robert
I agree with your explination and Robert's. Here's mine:
LFW
God be with you,
Dan
I want to make some more points on LFW. First, in reading some calvinists and in some of the discussions the word “determine” is sometimes used with two very distinct meanings” (1) it may mean that someone or something **causes** an event, or brings about something; and (2) it may mean that an event is necessitated, it must occur and cannot occur in any other way. The proponent of LFW denies that (2) is true, that all of our actions are necessitated. On the other hand, the proponent of LFW does not deny (1). All human actions have causes and so in the sense of (1) are determined. But not all human actions are necessitated in the sense of (2).
When a calvinist talks they are usually using (2) as their meaning. So they hear someone like me say that we deny that all events are necessitated and predetermined, and operating off (2) they conclude that we are saying that libertarian free will actions do not involve causes. Well that is an intentional equivocation committed by some zealous calvinists. I know because I have corrected them on this before, carefully explained the differences between (1) and (2) and yet they continued intentionally making the equivocation and saying that I (or we libertarians) believe that libertarian free will actions are **uncaused** events. That would be claiming that LFW involves neither (1) or (2). And that, when done repeatedly and intentionally is a lie. I deny (2) applies to our free will actions, but I affirm (1) so that I believe that when it comes to our free will actions, **we** determine the outcome, **we** bring something to pass. And since **we** do it, **we** can be held responsible for it (and are held responsible for it by God).
Some like Geisler have used the term “self-determinism” to make this point. Self-determinism means that when we are facing a choice between alternatives, say typing this post or not typing this post. We are able to actualize either possibility. And **we** are the cause of the actualization of the possibility that becomes an actual outcome. So if I choose to type this post, I was the determining cause, I brought this event about. Or if I chose not to type this post, then I was the determining cause,that brought about the event of me refraining from typing this post. In reality, I chose to type this post so you are now reading it. But I could have done otherwise and chosen not to type this post. Either way, it was **me**, it was my self, that determined (in the sense of {1}) or caused the choice to be actualized. So my action was not without cause, nor was it random, it was intentional and done for reasons.
I really get tired of how calvinists cannot take our view as it is and must intentionally and repeatedly caricature it with this claim that we believe that intentional actions are UNCAUSED or RANDOM or no different than LUCK, when all these things are not true and are false representations. The fact you correct them and they keep bringing them up again over and over, shows that those doing so are quite dishonest about this subject. If you want to attack our view, make sure you are attacking **our** view, not an intentionally constructed straw man or caricature.
If you want a good and clear presentation of self-determinism, an explanation of how agents freely choose to do their intentional actions by being the cause of their own actions and doing so for reasons, read John Searle’s RATIONALITY IN ACTION.
And if you want a clear example of self-determinism, of a person doing an intentional action done for reasons, but not being necessitated, look at God’s actions. He always does things for reasons, he causes things to occur, He is the cause of his own actions, his actions are not necessitated or predetermined, he acts as a person with libertarian free will. Now if you want to claim that conception of having and making choices is false or incoherent or whatever, then show how God does not act with the self-determinism that I have described here. As far as I have seen, no one has even come close to doing that.
Robert
God be with you,
Dan
I would also love to see someone from the Calvinist camp to address that issue.
Robert,
I agree with the concept but dont quite understand the Chomsky's example. As i see it the language choices are to a degree at least determined by internal factors like education, upbringing, culture,the situation we are at, etc. I translate my thoughts so end with different ways of expression then you who i presume think in english.
Would you care to elabore a bit?
Odeliya.
I had not noticed your email until now. I am busy with some things, but will be glad to talk more about Chomsky and free will at another time. Talk to you soon,
Robert
“I agree with the concept but don’t quite understand the Chomsky's example. As I see it the language choices are to a degree at least determined by internal factors like education, upbringing, culture, the situation we are at, etc. . . .Would you care to elabore a bit?”
B.F. Skinner was the leader of a school in psychology called behaviorism. They thought that everything that happens (with both man and animals) could be explained by means of a stimulus and then a response to that stimulus. Well Skinner made the mistake of writing a book on how children acquire language. In that book he tried to explain it by means of stimulus and response. Well Chomsky probably the most influential linguist of the twentieth century wrote a book review of Skinner’s book. Do a GOOGLE search under Noam Chomsky and B. F. Skinner and you will easily be able to access it.
Chomsky absolutely destroyed Skinners book and position, so much so that many believe that it also wiped out the behaviorist movement in psychology. This is significant because Skinner argued we do not have free will that our environment determines what we do. Chomsky in destroying this claim showed major problems with determinism. Chomsky pointed out that language involves our minds and involves choices. These choices are up to us, not determined (though influenced by other external factors) and so Chomsky provides some good points on the reality of free will with respect to language use. Example –if stimulus/response determined our response with what we say, then given a certain statement you would then have to say whatever it is that you say in response. But language use does not work like that. Say a woman buys a new dress and then says: “what do you think of my dress?” Does that statement necessitate a specific response? Or is the response to this statement open, meaning different things could be said in response to this same statement?
Linguists say one of the features of language is its “openness”. So in response to the lady with the new dress consider the following responses that could occur:
=no response (a person may choose not to say anything in response)
=”Oh, it looks great, where did you get it?” (positive compliment and request for information)
=”Oh, it looks great.’ ( positive compliment only)
=”why are you asking me I don’t know anything about dresses!” (response of disgust and disinterest)
=Etc.
=Etc.
=Etc.
Clearly depending on people’s choices there are all kinds of available choices to use when we speak. This is just one little example, but just look at your own language use. You choose what you say, how you say it, when you say it, if you say it, what language you say it in, etc. etc. Language use of even the most common variety involves lots and lots of choices where you really could do multiple things. And your words are not necessitated by the environment as Skinner argued and Chomsky destroyed his argument and his school of psychology. Hope this helps you understand. Or talk to a linguist about the reality and kinds of choices involved in language use. Or just look at yourself and see how you make choices when you speak.
Robert
thank you so very much . I see what he meant, and read the Chomsky's review.
I think he is right.
Would surely be interested what the calvinist reply to this would be.
Accountability issues that the denial of free will raises is what bothers me the most...
Well, looks like Dan is talking about it now as well in Edwards critique.
Thank you again,
Odeliya
“thank you so very much . I see what he meant, and read the Chomsky's review.
I think he is right.”
I am glad that you found it helpful and especially glad that you checked out the Chomsky review for yourself.
“Would surely be interested what the calvinist reply to this would be.
Accountability issues that the denial of free will raises is what bothers me the most...”
I agree with you that one of the major problems with calvinism, at least the form that claims that God predetermined every event, is that it wipes out personal responsibility. God causes everything to go a certain way (including all of our actions, thoughts, bodily movements, everything) so if we wants us to be sinners who continually sin and also reject Him, then that is what a person will do. That person then will end up at a final judgment where they will be sent to hell for doing exactly what God wanted them to do. If God holds people accountable like this that is not good or loving but is actually quite sadistic and cruel. That does not fit the God of the bible who allows people to act freely and then holds them responsible for how they freely chose.
“Thank you again,”
Your welcome.
Robert