Habits - Edwards' Arguments against the link between LFW and Responsibility
- Under LFW, our mind is in a state of indifference at the time of choice
- But reason tells us that the stronger the inclination, the more virtuous or evil the action
- Thus, LFW’s basis of responsibility contradicts reason (because we cannot at the same time be indifferent and have a strong inclination)
- If our minds were indifferent, we would expect an equal number of results (i.e. if we choose between A & B 100 times, we would choose A 50 times and B 50 times). Why should we be blamed if that’s the way it turns out?
- But this eliminates the possibility of good and bad habits – which people in fact have.
- If the Arminian objects and says motives do incline the mind, giving it a net bias, then they destroy LFW, which requires indifference. The motive would be predetermining the will.
My Response
I reject #1 as a misrepresentation of the Arminian view, but I don’t think that leads to the determinism of #6.
Edwards equivocates indifference of the will with indifference of the mind. Arminians sometimes use indifference to describe LFW. Arminius himself said: “The liberty of the will consists in this -- when all the requisites for willing or not willing are laid down, man is still indifferent to will or not to will, to will this rather than that.” (link) However, the idea is not that given actions preceding a choice, man doesn’t care about what he is about to choose. Rather, it’s that given all preceding causes, man’s will isn’t resolved one way or another by those causes. We desire and have reasons to choose either alternative, so our minds are not indifferent. Thus, given causes preceding a choice, our will is indifferent, but our mind is not.
Since I disagree with #1, I have to deal with #6.
The biggest problem with point #6 is that Edwards assumes deterministic causation is true. This point has already been dealt with here.
In point 6, Edwards use the term “net bias”. This is also part of the problem. There’s a difference between figuring out if an option is good or not versus figuring out if this option is better than that option. The first precedes choosing, the second is the choosing process itself. We don’t have a desire to both do and not do something. Rather, we have desires to do two different things at once. Desires don’t compete head-to-head, it’s a competition for scarce resources (i.e. we can only choose one of the options at a time). So although we have reasons (i.e. we are not indifferent in the sense of not caring), we don’t have a “net bias” before the choice.
So much for point #6, which basically resolves Edwards argument. I did however want to say a few words about points #2, #4 and #5.
Point #2 seems true. But since we reject #1, this is no problem for LFW. If we either choose quickly, or are unwilling to change a choice, or even if the choice is joined with a strong emotion, this tends to heighten praise or blame. This reminds me of the story of Phinehas in Numbers 25.
Edwards’ argument regarding expecting a choice for option A as often as option B versus habits in people's behavior has a consistency issue. If you assume LFW is true (as Edwards did in point 1) you must also assume Agent/indeterministic causation is true. But the reason Edwards expects a person to choose A an equal number of times as B is because he holds to deterministic causation. But these are contradictory assumptions. Deterministic and indeterministic causation are mutually exclusive.
On a probability scale between 0 and 1 (0 meaning never, 1 meaning always) we can choose so long as the probability is between 0 and 1. It could be .5, but it could also be .8. So long as it’s possible for us to choose either way, we have LFW.
Under deterministic causation, given preceding causes we are always at 0 or 1, never is there a probability that something else might happen. In point #1, Edwards assumes LFW is hypothetically true, so the probability of an act is neither 0 or 1. Where does Edwards go? .5 Why? Because he doesn’t think indeterministic causes, which increase probability, but don’t eliminate possibility, exist. But if you assume LFW is true, you must also assume indeterministic/agent causation is also true. So Edwards is being inconsistent.
Habits are patterns of human behavior. Typically they are based on either prior choices or broader choices. If you choose to be a Cowboys fan, you tend to choose to like Cowboy players. There can be exceptions, and you can always rethink the broader choice of being a Cowboys fan or not, but so long as you’re a Cowboys fan, you will tend to favor Cowboys players. The opposite is unlikely, but not impossible.
Comments
Now this could all be way over my head and I might not understand it, but with my limited understanding this is how I read it. I will try to read it several more times and perhaps I will see it differently.
Thank you for your question. I will requote the part of my prior post in question:
The way Edwards defines causes our choices don't have causes, but the way I define causes, they do. I don't think Edwards defines cause correctly or consistently. In part II.III Edwards defines cause as : I sometimes use the word Cause, in this inquiry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an Event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise. In this sense our choices have causes. But in part II.VIII Edwards says: If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their causes, then it will follow, that there are some things which come to pass without any cause and also, if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause... this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been sufficient, it would have done it.
On the one hand Edwards defines cause broadly as anything on which effects have complete or partial dependence, but on the other hand Edwards defines cause narrowly as having a necessary connection with the effect and being sufficient to produce the effect. That's the problem. Under the first definition, our choices have causes, under the second they don't.
The key difference between these two defintions of cause are 1) dependence vs. 2) sufficiency. This relates to the necessary/sufficent cause distinction.
Here's wikipedia's descrition of the difference:
Causes are often distinguished into two types: Necessary and sufficient.
Necessary causes:
If x is a necessary cause of y, then the presence of y necessarily implies the presence of x. The presence of x, however, does not imply that y will occur.
Sufficient causes:
If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the presence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the presence of x.
link
Edwards speaks of a necessary cause in II.III, then switches between a necessary and a sufficient cause in II.VIII.
Does that help?
God be with you,
Dan
Thanks for trying to help me, but I still don't see it. Let me try to express what I mean.
I understand what you are saying about necessary and sufficient, but when I read the Edwards link I got the impression that he was not advocating a sufficient cause, but was pointing out how that is wrong in his view.
I see that his view is expressed in II.III and he is trying to disprove the other view in II.VIII. So I guess I don't see how he is switching his definition, when he uses another definition in II.VIII I read it as him not advocating for it, rather trying to disprove it.
Again, I could just be missing it and will try to read it again. Perhaps if I slow down enough I may actually start to understand it better:)
In section II.VIII, Edwards argues against the idea that our choices can be free from necessity (i.e. against LFW). In doing so, he insists on a specific definition of causation: sufficient causation.
Edwards counters LFW with the following argument (my outline corresponding to Edwards’ statement):
1) Necessary causes imply the contradiction of something being a cause and not being a cause
2) A necessary cause could be in place one time and the thing not happen, but another time and the thing happen
3) This is proof it’s not a sufficient cause
(1) To suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of their existence, that yet are not necessarily connected with their cause, is to suppose that they have a cause which is not their cause. (2) Thus; if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause, with its influence, and influential circumstances; then, as I observed before, it is a thing possible and supposable, that the cause may sometimes exert the same influence, under the same circumstances, and yet the effect not follow. (3) And if this actually happens in any instance, this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been sufficient, it would have done it.
So Edwards here is denying necessary causes are causes, and insists that only sufficient causes are causes. But in II.III Edwards allows for necessary causes.
God be with you,
Dan
When I read II.VIII I do not read it as Edwards denying necessary causes are causes, I see him trying to tackle the Arminian view of causes. When I read section II.VIII I interpret Edwards as saying that the Arminian view holds that in some instances the cause will produce an effect and at another instance that same cause will not produce the same effect. I take the last paragraph to sum it up and he writes
If the matter be not already so plain as to render any further reasoning upon it impertinent, I would say, that which seems to be the cause in the supposed case, can be no cause; its power and influence having, on a full trial, proved insufficient to produce such an effect: and if it be not sufficient to produce it, then it does not produce it. To say otherwise, is to say, there is power to do that which there is not power to do. If there be in a cause sufficient power exerted, and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and so the effect be actually produced at one time; all these things concurring, will produce the effect at all times. And so we may turn it the other way; that which proves not sufficient at one time, cannot he sufficient at another, with precisely the same influential circumstances. And therefore if the effect follows, it is not owing to that cause; unless the different time be a circumstance which has influence: but that is contrary to the supposition; for it is supposed that all circumstances that have influence, are the same. And besides, this would be to suppose the time to be the cause; which is contrary to the supposition of the other thing being the cause. But if merely diversity of time has no influence, then it is evident that it is as much of an absurdity to say, the cause was sufficient to produce the effect at one time, and not at another; as to say, that it is sufficient to produce the effect at a certain time, and yet not sufficient to produce the same effect at the same time.
He then finishes with ”On the whole, it is clearly manifest, that every effect has a necessary connexion with its cause, or with that which is the true ground and reason of its existence. And therefore, if there be no event without a cause, as was proved before, then no event whatsoever is contingent, in the manner that Arminians suppose the free acts of the will to be contingent.”
I may just be missing it and apologize for wasting your time, but I see Edwards arguing against just sufficient causes in this section. He starts off writing ”And, first, I would inquire, whether there is or can be any such thing, as a volition which is contingent in such a sense, as not only to come to pass without any Necessity of constraint or co-action, but also without a Necessity of consequence, or an infallible connexion with any thing foregoing.-- Secondly, Whether, if it were so, this would at all help the cause of Liberty.” Edwards then writes And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shown, that nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, or a reason, why it exists in this manner rather than another; and the evidence of this has been particularly applied to the acts of the will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the acts of the will are never contingent, or without necessity, in the sense spoken of; inasmuch as those things which have a cause, or a reason of their existence, must be connected with their cause. This appears by the following considerations.
Also, looking at the title of this section it reads “Concerning the supposed Liberty of the will, as opposite to all Necessity”
Oh well, I will try to read it some more and perhaps see it in a new light.
When I read section II.VIII I interpret Edwards as saying that the Arminian view holds that in some instances the cause will produce an effect and at another instance that same cause will not produce the same effect. I take the last paragraph to sum it up and he writes
You’re right about that. But in dealing with the issue, he insists that only sufficient causes are causes.
God be with you,
Dan