Clarification for Turretinfan

Here’s the chain of posts between Turretinfan and myself leading to this one: (TF), (Me), (TF), (Me), (TF). I had asked: It rained this afternoon. Was it absolutely impossible for God to create a world which didn’t include rain this afternoon? TF requested clarification, so I am providing it… My question was not intended to be a puzzle, but I will see if I can clarify. Since I am not sure what you think I will go with a sort of drag net approach. Given whatever existed before the first act, was it absolutely impossible for God to create a world which didn’t include rain on May 31, 2008 in the afternoon?
  • Where the “first act” is either creation or whatever else you might consider God’s first act.
  • Where “first” probably means temporal order but if you believe in atemporal, but logically sequenced, actions, then logical order.
  • Where “act” means you would no longer just say “God is XYZ”, but “God does (or did) XYZ”.
  • Where “act” includes not only physical motion but also spiritual action or anything else you consider action.
  • Where “whatever existed” includes God’s nature and council and whatever else you think existed inactively before God’s first act.
  • Where “absolutely impossible” means that not only did God create the world as He did, but He had to. And not only did God not create anything different than He did, but He could not have created the world any differently.
  • Where “absolutely impossible” is not a sense which excludes some things from consideration, but rather on that includes all things which existed before the first act.
  • And “rain on May 31, 2008 in the afternoon” means drops of water coming from the clouds yesterday after 12PM or rap artists with so much cash that they tossed it in the air and watched it fall all around themselves and their crew.
Let allow me to ask a second question, which I think is similar to the first (although you might disagree with me that it’s similar). You speak of God having determined things. Was God’s determination an action or an inactive part of His nature preceding His first act? Kindly permit me to ask a third question which again I think has an equivalent foundation to the first and second. John the Baptist claimed God could raise up children of Abraham out of stones. Was John right? With great presumption on my part I will press my luck and ask a fourth and impertinent question. If I ask does God have LFW, is your response “LFW doesn’t exist” or “don’t know, don’t care”?

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