Recap of debate with Turretinfan on God’s freewill

Here’s a recap of some highlights from my debate with Turretinfan on God’s freewill. (Fair warning, I am being selective and I am summarizing things in my own words!!! The debate was massive, so I am picking the parts I thought most important. I am however providing links to all the posts of the debate.) TF: Libertarian Freewill (LFW) seems illogical. We either have no reason for our choices or our choices are determined. Me: If LFW is illogical, God doesn’t have LFW. But Genesis 1:1 teaches God has LFW, because causal forces couldn’t have preceded God’s first act. TF: Although there was no action before Creation, nevertheless God's nature and counsel, being eternal, preceded the first action. ...Thus, there is a cause and explanation for Creation: the Triune God. Me: Good! That’s agent causation and it’s half the battle. Now the other half. It rained this afternoon. Given whatever existed before the first act, was it absolutely impossible for God to create a world which didn’t include rain on May 31, 2008 in the afternoon? TF: "absolutely impossible" needs to be clarified Me: Considering either a logical or temporal sequence and either creation or whatever you think God’s first act was, did God have to make it rain considering everything that existed before that first act? TF: There is no reason to hold to a view that God has ever been inactive, such that there was a "first act" of God. Also, “had to” implies God was forced. Me: Doesn’t that contradict your statement above that there was no action before creation? Also, an infinite regression of actions seems inconsistent with A) God’s nature causing His actions which you asserted above and B) any explanation as to the source of action. As to “had to”, before creation there wasn’t anyone around to force God’s actions. Rather, it’s a question of God’s intrinsic abilities. TF: Creation is the first act in time. Me: Doesn’t matter. Something must be first in both logical and temporal sequences. You have asserted creation is first in time and God’s nature is first in the logical sequence. In neither case could there be an infinite regression of action. Supposing there is one removes the possibility of explaining action: the very problem you lay at the feet of LFW at the outset. I can answer my question above very simply. Yes, God could have created a world in which it didn’t rain. But it’s a tough question for TF, because he’s a determinist. TF: The actions I am talking about have nothing to do with either a logical or temporal sequence. In response to Dan’s question: if one is speaking of God's power in isolation from the other attributes of God (the remainder of his nature), yes. That’s the natural way to answer the question. Here’s my take on the order: 1. God exists;2. God has a nature/attributes;3. God acts based on his nature/attributes;4. Among God's timeless acts, God decrees to create; 5. God, logically subsequent to the decree to act, knows that (and what) he will create; and6. Among God's acts, and as the first temporal act, and logically subsequent to the decree and knowledge, God creates. Me: You altered the question. I asked “Given whatever existed before the first act…” You responded “if one is speaking of God's power in isolation from the other attributes of God”. Perhaps I can clarify the question further by appealing to reformed literature. Francis Turretin distinguishes between the divided and compound sense, Jonathan Edwards distinguishes between the will and the body, contemporary Calvinists speak of the freedom to choose, if we had wanted to. I am speaking in a compound sense (not a divided sense) about the will (not the body) and about an actual ability (not a hypothetical one). Hopefully that further clarifies what I am getting at. TF: I have two questions. 1) Given the order I provide above, what’s the reference point you have in mind about absolute impossibility? 2) is God loving himself and/or his creation an action of God's in terms of the question you ask? Me: 1) I would merge points 3 & 4, calling God’s decree His first act in a logical sequence. So the reference point is between God’s nature and His decree. 2) With respect to God’s love of Himself, no that’s not the kind of action I am talking about. I am talking about an act that’s part of a cause/effect relationship. The Father’s love of the Son doesn’t cause a change in the Son, so that’s not the type of action I am looking for. TF: In response to your question, I am not sure, but I don’t think God, considering everything before His decree, could have decreed to create a world in which it didn’t rain on May 31. God does what’s best, which seems to suggest the alternatives were worse. It would be contrary to God’s nature to unwisely do what’s worse. Me: It’s not enough to say God’s able to do X if He chooses to, but He’s unable to choose X. That’s a slight to omnipotence. God necessarily wills what’s best as an end, but He freely chooses among many means of getting there. God’s power isn’t a passive potency, unable to act without a cause. His power is the source of all possibilities (i.e. the variety of means of getting there). I am not sure if TF plans on responding, but if he does I will let him have the last word. Turretinfan, God bless you for your efforts in this edifying debate.

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