Dan Chapa

Edwards’ arguments in part V.III and part V.IV Edwards splits necessity into two categories: natural and moral. Natural necessity relates to our actions, moral necessity relates to our wills. If an act is naturally necessary, it is either against or without our will, and whether we will or not the result is the same. Edwards says that natural necessity is the common meaning of necessity and moral necessity is philosophical. Natural necessity (common necessity) is a sense wholly different than that used in the Calvinist/Arminian debate. Most people go through their whole lives without thinking about moral necessity (philosophical necessity) and its relationship with responsibility. People use the terms “must, cannot, necessary, unable, impossible, unavoidable, and irresistible” signifying natural necessity. Natural necessity is incompatible with responsibility. The common notion of responsibility is A) doing what we please and B) what we please being wrong. Arminians equivocate common

Outline of Edwards’ arguments in part V.II Arminians say that without self-determining power, we have no power of action, acts are not our own, and we must be passive. This isn’t the way people use “action” in common speech. Used this way action is either causeless or an infinite regression of causes. When we speak of a first cause, if nothing causes something, nothing could prevent it, so therefore it is necessary. The common notion of action is the effects of the will. Arminians think of action as self-determination, because the motion of our bodies is caused by our wills – so they assume the same applies to the motion of our wills. God is necessarily good yet responsible, which disproves the idea that our actions must be free from necessity for us to be responsible. My Response #1 is correct, but let me add a bit more to avoid equivocation. Edwards is getting to the difference between agent and event causation. The two key concepts here are: the difference between acting a

Outline of Edwards Arguments in part V.I Arminians say if something causally predetermines our choices, we are not responsible. But responsibility is not the cause of choices, it’s in the nature of choices If responsibility is in the cause of choices, we search through an infinite regression of causes, and nothing is ever responsible. My Response Point 1 is close, but not quite accurate. While our actions can be predetermined, our choices cannot be. Choice cannot be predetermined, else it’s not choice. Predeterminism leave us with only one possible action, but choice requires alternatives (i.e. more than one). A “predetermined choice” is self-contradictory, implying we can choose something we can’t choose. So we think Calvinists are inconsistent for saying we can choose. Also, Arminians agree that we are responsible for our choices. Even though we deny we are responsible for things we are causally predetermined to do, we are not saying responsibility lies in the cause of choices,

Background - LFW and responsibility Under LFW, we are the causal source of our choices (i.e. nothing causally predetermines our choices); we are responsible for our choices. There’s nowhere else to go to. We can’t back track to something else - we are responsible. Under CFW, since our actions are causally predetermined, we can trace back the cause of our actions to something outside of us. Thus, we keep searching for the source of our actions to find out what’s ultimately responsible. When Calvinists say God is the ultimate source, we say they make God ultimately responsible for sin. Even if God establishes a system in which only secondary causes get punished and the primary cause does not (as Calvinists suppose), that doesn’t change the fact that God is ultimately responsible for sin. The issue isn’t one of God’s power or sovereignty, it’s a matter of His goodness and holiness. This is a classic Arminian argument, but Edwards attempts to turn the tables on Arminians, by arguing a

Outline of Edwards’ arguments in part III.V Some falsely argue we can’t perform our spiritual duties, but desire these things, so they are excusable. This entails the contradiction that we are inclined and disinclined to the same thing Obedience consists in the inclination itself The inclination is itself the choice “Desire without performance” is a phrase sometimes used, but it's improper as the desire relates to something future or something else is the object of desire. (i.e. someone might say a drunk doesn't want to drink the drink he's drinking, meaning: a drunk who desires to avoid drinking “someday” so he can keep his money) This “indirect willingness” falls short of any virtue or even partial obedience to God’s command “Sincerity” in indirect willingness doesn’t make it any better, people can be sincerity about bad things. I already addressed the inconsistency between Edwards and modern Calvinists on the will here , but I wanted to address the argument itself. My

Turretinfan recently commented ( link ) on a post by Ben Witherington ( link ). It’s related to our ongoing discussion of divine freedom which I last commented on here . TF said some things I agree with, and some I do not. Since Turretinfan holds two false premises: 1) LFW does not exist and 2) CFW exists, of course many false conclusions follow, and TF’s response to Ben are no exception to this. To me, it makes most sense to discuss the premises firsts, so to that end I will wait for TF to respond to my question to him: Given whatever existed before the first act, was it absolutely impossible for God to create a world which didn’t include rain on May 31, 2008 in the afternoon?

Many Calvinists today think of free will as the ability to choose what we desire most. They view our strongest desire as the determining cause of choice. That doesn’t seem to be the way Edwards saw things. Edwards claims that reason, not desire determines choice. In places where I was expecting Edwards to say desire determines choice, I find Edwards saying reason determines choice. Whereas the modern Calvinist definition of choosing what we desire most concerns me as having too dim a view of reason and making our actions too similar to animal instincts, this is not a charge that applies to Edwards. Edwards view is simply different than modern Calvinists - he says reason determines choices, they say desire determines choices. A close reading of Edwards’ book about the will reveals that not only does he not say desire determines choice, he says reason determines choices. In fact, what Edwards says about desire rules out the idea that our choices are determined by our strongest desire. I

I will be offline for about a week or so. Be good!!! Dan

Here’s the chain of posts between Turretinfan and myself leading to this one: ( TF ), ( Me ), ( TF ), ( Me ), ( TF ). I had asked: It rained this afternoon. Was it absolutely impossible for God to create a world which didn’t include rain this afternoon? TF requested clarification, so I am providing it… My question was not intended to be a puzzle, but I will see if I can clarify. Since I am not sure what you think I will go with a sort of drag net approach. Given whatever existed before the first act, was it absolutely impossible for God to create a world which didn’t include rain on May 31, 2008 in the afternoon? Where the “first act” is either creation or whatever else you might consider God’s first act. Where “first” probably means temporal order but if you believe in atemporal, but logically sequenced, actions, then logical order. Where “act” means you would no longer just say “God is XYZ”, but “God does (or did) XYZ”. Where “act” includes not only physical motion but also s