Compatiblist Argument
Many Calvinist argue that our actions either happen randomly or by a cause. Jonathan Edwards argues something of this sort in Freedom of the Will.
This is a tough argument. We can’t really explain why we choose what we do.
We can look at the various factors in a choice. There are many things that are necessary to make a choice, such as the object that we choose (let’s say icecream) and the desire to choose it. We need the object and the desire to be able to choose it. But in some cases we eat icecream and in some cases we don’t. So the object and desire are necessary for choice, but not sufficient for choice. That is to say, we don’t act on every desire and no object is selected all the time.
So it’s tough to answer the argument. And the reason this is the case is because we can’t ask why indefinitely. If we, the agent, are the source of our actions, then we can’t seek a further source. In indeterministic causation, the chain of causes stops and a new chain originates with an indeterministic cause. So we can’t ask what the cause was. That begs the question against indeterministic causation.
This seems unsatisfying for a compatiblist. But the tables can be turned on their argument rather quickly. What exactly causes our choices and how do these causes impact our wills? I am not looking for something general, or what is needed for choices. Give me the specifics. I think compatiblists will have as hard a time answering these questions as libertarians have answering why we choose what we do.
Further, we have an example of an indeterministic cause. That is to say a cause which was not preceded by a previous cause. That is God. If He is the uncaused cause, than nothing caused Him to do what He did. Was God’s first act random or caused? Neither. He’s proof of freewill.
This is a tough argument. We can’t really explain why we choose what we do.
We can look at the various factors in a choice. There are many things that are necessary to make a choice, such as the object that we choose (let’s say icecream) and the desire to choose it. We need the object and the desire to be able to choose it. But in some cases we eat icecream and in some cases we don’t. So the object and desire are necessary for choice, but not sufficient for choice. That is to say, we don’t act on every desire and no object is selected all the time.
So it’s tough to answer the argument. And the reason this is the case is because we can’t ask why indefinitely. If we, the agent, are the source of our actions, then we can’t seek a further source. In indeterministic causation, the chain of causes stops and a new chain originates with an indeterministic cause. So we can’t ask what the cause was. That begs the question against indeterministic causation.
This seems unsatisfying for a compatiblist. But the tables can be turned on their argument rather quickly. What exactly causes our choices and how do these causes impact our wills? I am not looking for something general, or what is needed for choices. Give me the specifics. I think compatiblists will have as hard a time answering these questions as libertarians have answering why we choose what we do.
Further, we have an example of an indeterministic cause. That is to say a cause which was not preceded by a previous cause. That is God. If He is the uncaused cause, than nothing caused Him to do what He did. Was God’s first act random or caused? Neither. He’s proof of freewill.
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