Free will
Phm 1:13 whom I wished to keep with me, so that on your behalf he might minister to me in my imprisonment for the gospel;
Phm 1:14 but without your consent I did not want to do anything, so that your goodness would not be, in effect, by compulsion but of your own free will.
Paul could have asked Onesimus, Philemon’s escaped servant, to stay with him and help him in the gospel work at Rome. In this way Philemon would benefit Paul’s ministry. But Paul wanted Philemon to have a choice in the matter.
The bible says in many places that we have wills and make choices. How should we define choice? The term freewill is redundant. The will cannot be forced, it has to be free. In the same way, the term libertarian freewill is double redundant. Again, the will has to be free and at liberty to be a will.
But the term libertarian freewill does help distinguish between another viewpoint, compatiblist freewill. This is the viewpoint that the freedom of the will is consistent with determinism. Determinism is the idea that everything that happens had a preceding cause such that it necessarily happens and the opposite cannot happen. Man is free in the sense that no one is forcing you to do something you do not want to do. In contrast, libertarian freedom is the idea that we are able to do otherwise than what we will do. Do even if I choose to put on a blue shirt today, I could have chosen a red one. The compatiblist denies this and says that based on all preceding causes, I had to put on the red one.
Notice is said “put on” but not “choose”. I don’t think what the compatiblist calls choice can be called choice. Choice is a selection between alternatives. For the compatiblist, putting on the red shirt was impossible. So was it really an alternative? It looked like one, but it wasn’t something I was able to do. So if we are able to choose between alternatives, then the alternatives must be something we are able to select. So I don’t think what the compatiblist calls choice can actually be a choice. But the bible says we are able to make choices.
There’s another reason why I am hesitant to call what a compatiblist calls choice, choice. People have the ability to reason and the ability to desire and these abilities are part of man’s immaterial soul. If a mad scientist were to dissect me, they wouldn’t find my will. Isn’t not just a matter of gene mapping, there’s a ghost in the machine. The compatiblist claims something caused me to choose a blue shirt. Perhaps it was matter in my brain, or perhaps my genes or perhaps the circumstances, or perhaps some combination of them. This would make sense if my will were physical. What exactly do these causes do to my will? Move it? It’s not physical. Efficient causation refers to motion. These causes could skip my immaterial soul and act on my body making me put on the blue shirt. But the bible says we have souls and wills.
Phm 1:14 but without your consent I did not want to do anything, so that your goodness would not be, in effect, by compulsion but of your own free will.
Paul could have asked Onesimus, Philemon’s escaped servant, to stay with him and help him in the gospel work at Rome. In this way Philemon would benefit Paul’s ministry. But Paul wanted Philemon to have a choice in the matter.
The bible says in many places that we have wills and make choices. How should we define choice? The term freewill is redundant. The will cannot be forced, it has to be free. In the same way, the term libertarian freewill is double redundant. Again, the will has to be free and at liberty to be a will.
But the term libertarian freewill does help distinguish between another viewpoint, compatiblist freewill. This is the viewpoint that the freedom of the will is consistent with determinism. Determinism is the idea that everything that happens had a preceding cause such that it necessarily happens and the opposite cannot happen. Man is free in the sense that no one is forcing you to do something you do not want to do. In contrast, libertarian freedom is the idea that we are able to do otherwise than what we will do. Do even if I choose to put on a blue shirt today, I could have chosen a red one. The compatiblist denies this and says that based on all preceding causes, I had to put on the red one.
Notice is said “put on” but not “choose”. I don’t think what the compatiblist calls choice can be called choice. Choice is a selection between alternatives. For the compatiblist, putting on the red shirt was impossible. So was it really an alternative? It looked like one, but it wasn’t something I was able to do. So if we are able to choose between alternatives, then the alternatives must be something we are able to select. So I don’t think what the compatiblist calls choice can actually be a choice. But the bible says we are able to make choices.
There’s another reason why I am hesitant to call what a compatiblist calls choice, choice. People have the ability to reason and the ability to desire and these abilities are part of man’s immaterial soul. If a mad scientist were to dissect me, they wouldn’t find my will. Isn’t not just a matter of gene mapping, there’s a ghost in the machine. The compatiblist claims something caused me to choose a blue shirt. Perhaps it was matter in my brain, or perhaps my genes or perhaps the circumstances, or perhaps some combination of them. This would make sense if my will were physical. What exactly do these causes do to my will? Move it? It’s not physical. Efficient causation refers to motion. These causes could skip my immaterial soul and act on my body making me put on the blue shirt. But the bible says we have souls and wills.
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