Response to Wes (Compatiblist Arminianism)

Recently Wes (aka Remonstrant) asked me whether I thought Compatiblism was compatible with Arminianism. I responded here: http://danchapa.blogspot.com/2007/10/is-compatibalism-mutually-exclusive.html#links arguing that compatiblism was incompatible with Arminian Soteriology and here: http://danchapa.blogspot.com/2007/10/compatiblistic-agent.html arguing that compatiblism could not use agent causation to explain responsibility. Wes offer this counter: “The usual notions, that in compatibilism, God is ultimately accountable for the acts and thoughts of His creatures, and God’s universal offer of salvation is not sincere, are not completely right. At least as it seems to me, especially when I could advance the claim that before the creation of His creatures, the usually omniscient God was somehow (How? Maybe God withheld His knowledge, or He factored certain contingencies in, or we can simply say He had created us free [in a compatibilist sense]) ignorant of the future choices of His would-be-created creatures. In other words, God created us, but in a way that our natures (or souls) are not predetermined by His act of creation.” From this I incorrectly assumed that Wes was not in fact a compatiblist in the strict sense. However, Wes has clarified his viewpoint. He provided a quote from Tercel on a forum: “God has natural knowledge. God decides he wants to create a world. God creates the souls of the people that are going to be in that world by an indeterministic process (thus God doesn't know the outcome until it happens). The agents themselves, once created, have compatibilistic free will. Therefore immediately after the creation of the agents God gains middle knowledge. (What makes middle knowledge not natural knowledge is that God can't know it prior to the creation of the agents because the creation of the agents is indeterministic) God, in his middle knowledge, examines all the possible univeses and creates the one he likes best.” http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1043397&postcount=37 OK a few things here. First off, just a word of caution about Tercel. He is an Open Theist and as such does not advocate the view he is putting forward. His strategy seems to be denying Molinism and forcing Molinists to either embrace Calvinism or Open Theism. That said, his tactics don’t make him right or wrong about this Arminian/Compatiblist view. As for differences between this view and Arminian/Molinism three come to mind right of the bat. First, this view and Arminianism differ on the definition of freewill. Second, they differ on the definition of determinism. Third, they differ on the source of truth. For Arminians, a person has freewill if the agent is able to do either A or B. Compatiblists often make this claim as well. But when pushed they explain that a person is able to A, if A is his strongest desire, or B if B is his strongest desire. So the ability to do either is only hypothetical. Man could have had the ability to do the opposite, given a different desire than he actually had, but in actuality he doesn’t have the ability to do the opposite. Arminians however, view mans power over alternative possibilities as actual, not just hypothetical. So on this point Arminians and Compatiblists differ. Second, Tercel is defining determinism in terms of knowledge, not just causation. Tercel explains determinism in such a way that an event is indeterministic if no one is able to make a determination regarding the outcome. So far Arminians agree. Analyzing preceding causes will not yield certain predictions of the outcome. But Tercel pushes the point just a bit further. If anyone knows the outcome with certainty, it’s already determined. For Tercel it doesn’t matter if that knowledge is obtained only by looking at causality or if it’s know via other means. It’s determined. Arminians however disagree and think determinism relates to causality. So on this point Arminians and Tercel differ. Finally, Tercel advocates that reality causes truth. So if I choose to put on a blue shirt, I have caused the proposition “I am wearing a blue shirt” to be true. Arminian/Molinists disagree. I caused the state of affairs to be. That is to say I caused the blue shirt to be on me. I didn’t cause the truth, just the state of affairs. Truth corresponds to the state of affairs. But the relationship between the state of affairs and the truth is logical, not causal. Causal relationships work temporally forward (ie the cause precedes the effect). Logical relationships are immediate and not temporally successive. So Arminian/Molinists don’t see the relationship here as causal. This is fundamental to Molinism, so as to not entail backwards causation. So on this point Arminian/Molinists and Tercel differ. So in addition to differing on the views of soteriology and responsibly, Arminian/Molinists also differs from Arminian/Compatiblists in the areas of the definition of freewill, the definition of determinism and the relationship between reality and truth. Does Tercel’s view solve the difficulty with responsibility and sincerity of the offer of the Gospel for other compatiblists? I don’t see how. Even if God’s creation is indeterminists and God doesn’t know the outcome, we still have a problem. God’s first act after creation of man’s souls is to determine all outcomes. So we still have God as the causal source of evil and we still have God making man an offer that He causes them to reject.