Calvinism and Determinism 4 (response to Turretinfan)

TF: The price is sufficient to save, but is not used to that end.

Yes, but you speak of Christ’s death as if it’s only a value and not also a use of that value.

TF: The act of offering is what makes the sacrifice efficient

Owens says God lays the sins of the elect on Christ first, then Christ carries them to the cross and pays the price, actually satisfying justice through His death. The intention, sin transfer, offering, and acceptance are all required. Without them, Christ’s death would not, and could not save anyone. As it stands, you seem to hold to the contradiction that the value of Christ’s death is both sufficient and it requires something else.

Me: "I had asked Turretinfan a question (well 2 questions) that he didn’t answer, so I will ask again: do you consider yourself a determinist and if so, what type of determinist are you?"TF: I think GIMJ needs to read my response more carefully. I indicated that under GIMJ's proffered definition of "determinism" (from the Stanford philosophy web site) Calvinism was obviously not determinism. Since GIMJ knows I am a Calvinist, one might expect him to make the mental connection that was there implicitly.

I believe you were the one who point out there is verity among determinists. Just because you are one type does not mean you are not another. You accuse me of smearing Calvinists, but perhaps you are smearing determinists. From my point of view, LFW and determinism are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. So your attacks of LFW lead me to believe you are a determinist. Perhaps not all Calvinists are. I think in Augustus Hopkins Strong’s attempts to put some space between himself and determinists he ends up putting some space between himself and Edwards; space which I don’t think you would allow.

Here’s Strong’s statements:


But this certainty is not necessity. In reconciling God's decrees with human
freedom, we must not go to the other extreme, and reduce human freedom to mere
determinism, or the power of the agent to act out his character in the
circumstances which environ him. Human action is not simply the expression of
previously dominant affections; else neither Satan nor Adam could have fallen,
nor could the Christian ever sin. We therefore part company with Jonathan
Edwards and his Treatise on the Freedom of the Will, as well as with the younger
Edwards (Works, 1: 420), Alexander (Moral Science, 107), and Charles Hodge
(Syst. Theology, 2 : 278 ), all of whom follow Jonathan Edwards in identifying
sensibility with the will, in regarding affections as the causes of volitions,
and in speaking of the connection between motive and action as a necessary one.
We hold, on the contrary, that sensibility and will are two distinct powers,
that affections are occasions but never causes of volitions, and that, while
motives may infallibly persuade, they never compel the will. The power to make
the decision other than it is resides in the will, though it may never be
exercised. With Charnock, the Puritan (Attributes, 1 : 448-450 ), we say that "
man hath a power to do otherwise than that which God foreknows he will do."
Since, then. God's decrees are not executed by laying compulsion upon human
wills, they are not inconsistent with man's freedom. - Strong’s Systematic Theology, p93.




I don’t know if Strong’s attempts work, but the fact that he’s making the attempt says something. On the question of a necessary connection between motives and action, are you with Strong or Edwards?

TF: Actual ability unless/until used is hypothecated on something. Consequently, there is no meaningful line between "actual" and "hypothetical" ability as to unused ability.

Me: "I disagree. Ability (whether it will be used or not) does not require a hypothesis. Projecting the results might. If he chooses A, B will follow. But the actual ability does not."

TF: Despite GIMJ's disagreement, he's mistaken. One can see that he's mistaken from the fact that he conflates "unless/until used" with "whether it will be used or not." The two concepts are not convertable, though they are related. Ability unless/until used exists in hypothecation. Instantiation or prohibition removes that hypothecation.

Let’s test your hypothesis (pun intended). What’s hypothetical in the statement, God was able to decree to create the world?

God be with you,
Dan

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