Church Fathers - ARGUMENT TEN
XII. ARGUMENT TEN
And lastly, our opinion tends much more to the glory of God, than does the contrary opinion. For seeing God is chiefly glorified by the acknowledgment and discovery of his excellencies, and more particularly of those attributes which do inform us of our duty, and are proposed for our imitation, that doctrine which tends most to the acknowledgment of those attributes, must most directly tend to the advancement of God's glory.
Now, first, the wisdom of God is most glorified by that opinion which supposes He acts with man in all his precepts, exhortations, invitations, promises and threats, suitably to those faculties that He has given us, and doth not attempt by them 'to engage us to impossibilities’. For is it not a foul imputation upon the divine wisdom to suppose that He uses and appoints means for the recovery of mankind, which he knows cannot in the least degree be serviceable to that end?' But such is the consequence of that opinion which makes it as impossible for the sinner to be converted, as for the dead to be raised, by any of those arguments or motives delivered by him in the scripture to engage us to repent and turn unto him: For, according to tins hypothesis, we might as well send ministers to preach to stones, and persuade them to be converted into men; for His omnipotence can, upon their preaching, produce this change in those stones: and according to this opinion, the conversion of a sinner cannot be effected without a like act of the divine omnipotency.
Secondly, whereas according to our doctrine, the truth and faithfulness of God, and the sincerity of his dealings with men is unquestionable; according to the other doctrine, God seems to promise pardon and salvation to all men sincerely, and yet in truth intends it only to some few persons whom he designed to convert by an irresistible power; leaving the salvation of the rest impossible, because He never designed to afford them this unfrustrable operation, enquiring why those men would die, why they would not be made clean, whom He knew could not avoid that death, or obtain that purgation without that divine impulse He would not afford them; and saying He had purged them who were not purged, and had done all things requisite to make his vineyard bring forth good grapes, when he had withheld from them that unfrustrable operation without which they neither could be purged, nor bring forth good grapes.
Thirdly, whereas the justice of God shines evidently from our doctrine, which asserts that God doth only punish men for willful sins, which it was in their power to avoid; it never can be glorified by that doctrine which supposes that he punishes men with the extremes and most lasting torments, for not accepting those offers of grace tendered by the gospel, which it was not possible for them to comply with or embrace, without that farther grace which he purposed absolutely to deny them.
Now such is the consequence of that opinion which resolves the conversion of sinners into that unfrustrable operation which is vouchsafed only to a few, but is withheld from all the rest of mankind to whom grace is offered by the gospel.
Fourthly, is it not for God's glory that the praise of what good we do should be ascribed to his grace, and the shame of our evil doings should rest upon ourselves, as 'our own conscience shows it does by the remorse which follows the commission of sin? But what reason can there be for this, unless we suppose it possible for the wicked to have been converted, or to have accused to do evil? If indeed you ascribe conversion and obedience to a cause that transcends all the power of man under the gospel dispensation to perform, his evil actions may be his misfortunes, but how they should be his faults, it is not easy to conceive.
I should now proceed to show the concurrence of antiquity with this doctrine; but this will be fully done by me in the following DISCOURSE, where it will evidently be proved that the Fathers, in their confutation of the assertors of fate, and of the heresies of the Valentinians, the Marcionites, the Basilidians, the Manichieans, the doctrines of Origen, and upon many other occasions, use the very same arguments in confutation of those heresies and doctrines, which I have done in confutation of this doctrine. To this I shall at present only add, that the Fathers generally teach that God does only persuade, and by his Spirit assist those that are willing to be good; but leaves them still under the power to neglect and resist his persuasions, not laying them under a necessity to be good, because that would destroy the virtue and reward of being so.
"God," says Irenaeus, "redeems his from the apostate spirit, non vi, sed suadela, ' not by force, but by persuasion;' quemadmodum decebat Deum suadentem, et non vim tnferentem aecipere qua veliet, ' as it became God to receive what he would by persuasion, and not by force'.
He sent his Son into the world," says Justin Martyr, "os pethon beiluminos 'as persuading but not compelling men to be good.' "
The wisdom of God," says Cyril of Alexandria, " thought fit to convert men rather by persuasion, than by necessity, that he might preserve the liberty of man's will; for because," says he, " the Maker of all things, 'will have man to have power over his own self, and be governed by his own will, in what he does,' it seemed good to 'our Savior, 'that man should be withdrawn from what is bad, and drawn to what is better, rather by persuasion than by a necessity laid upon him;' for if, having invincible power, he had commanded all men to believe, 'faith would not have been the fruit of a full persuasion; but rather of necessity and unavoidable commands.' And again, " man," says he, ‘ is carried both to good and evil by free motions;' ‘if God, by using a divine energy and virtue, (that is, an unfrustrable operation,) should turn the mind of every man to good works, his goodness would not be the fruit of counsel or praiseworthy,' ' but rather of necessity.' “And if God had dealt thus with man at the beginning, and afterwards (that is, after the fall,) subjected him, to necessary turns (to vice or virtue,) and unavoidable concupiscence or lusting,' how can he be freed from blame”?
And lastly, our opinion tends much more to the glory of God, than does the contrary opinion. For seeing God is chiefly glorified by the acknowledgment and discovery of his excellencies, and more particularly of those attributes which do inform us of our duty, and are proposed for our imitation, that doctrine which tends most to the acknowledgment of those attributes, must most directly tend to the advancement of God's glory.
Now, first, the wisdom of God is most glorified by that opinion which supposes He acts with man in all his precepts, exhortations, invitations, promises and threats, suitably to those faculties that He has given us, and doth not attempt by them 'to engage us to impossibilities’. For is it not a foul imputation upon the divine wisdom to suppose that He uses and appoints means for the recovery of mankind, which he knows cannot in the least degree be serviceable to that end?' But such is the consequence of that opinion which makes it as impossible for the sinner to be converted, as for the dead to be raised, by any of those arguments or motives delivered by him in the scripture to engage us to repent and turn unto him: For, according to tins hypothesis, we might as well send ministers to preach to stones, and persuade them to be converted into men; for His omnipotence can, upon their preaching, produce this change in those stones: and according to this opinion, the conversion of a sinner cannot be effected without a like act of the divine omnipotency.
Secondly, whereas according to our doctrine, the truth and faithfulness of God, and the sincerity of his dealings with men is unquestionable; according to the other doctrine, God seems to promise pardon and salvation to all men sincerely, and yet in truth intends it only to some few persons whom he designed to convert by an irresistible power; leaving the salvation of the rest impossible, because He never designed to afford them this unfrustrable operation, enquiring why those men would die, why they would not be made clean, whom He knew could not avoid that death, or obtain that purgation without that divine impulse He would not afford them; and saying He had purged them who were not purged, and had done all things requisite to make his vineyard bring forth good grapes, when he had withheld from them that unfrustrable operation without which they neither could be purged, nor bring forth good grapes.
Thirdly, whereas the justice of God shines evidently from our doctrine, which asserts that God doth only punish men for willful sins, which it was in their power to avoid; it never can be glorified by that doctrine which supposes that he punishes men with the extremes and most lasting torments, for not accepting those offers of grace tendered by the gospel, which it was not possible for them to comply with or embrace, without that farther grace which he purposed absolutely to deny them.
Now such is the consequence of that opinion which resolves the conversion of sinners into that unfrustrable operation which is vouchsafed only to a few, but is withheld from all the rest of mankind to whom grace is offered by the gospel.
Fourthly, is it not for God's glory that the praise of what good we do should be ascribed to his grace, and the shame of our evil doings should rest upon ourselves, as 'our own conscience shows it does by the remorse which follows the commission of sin? But what reason can there be for this, unless we suppose it possible for the wicked to have been converted, or to have accused to do evil? If indeed you ascribe conversion and obedience to a cause that transcends all the power of man under the gospel dispensation to perform, his evil actions may be his misfortunes, but how they should be his faults, it is not easy to conceive.
I should now proceed to show the concurrence of antiquity with this doctrine; but this will be fully done by me in the following DISCOURSE, where it will evidently be proved that the Fathers, in their confutation of the assertors of fate, and of the heresies of the Valentinians, the Marcionites, the Basilidians, the Manichieans, the doctrines of Origen, and upon many other occasions, use the very same arguments in confutation of those heresies and doctrines, which I have done in confutation of this doctrine. To this I shall at present only add, that the Fathers generally teach that God does only persuade, and by his Spirit assist those that are willing to be good; but leaves them still under the power to neglect and resist his persuasions, not laying them under a necessity to be good, because that would destroy the virtue and reward of being so.
"God," says Irenaeus, "redeems his from the apostate spirit, non vi, sed suadela, ' not by force, but by persuasion;' quemadmodum decebat Deum suadentem, et non vim tnferentem aecipere qua veliet, ' as it became God to receive what he would by persuasion, and not by force'.
He sent his Son into the world," says Justin Martyr, "os pethon beiluminos 'as persuading but not compelling men to be good.' "
The wisdom of God," says Cyril of Alexandria, " thought fit to convert men rather by persuasion, than by necessity, that he might preserve the liberty of man's will; for because," says he, " the Maker of all things, 'will have man to have power over his own self, and be governed by his own will, in what he does,' it seemed good to 'our Savior, 'that man should be withdrawn from what is bad, and drawn to what is better, rather by persuasion than by a necessity laid upon him;' for if, having invincible power, he had commanded all men to believe, 'faith would not have been the fruit of a full persuasion; but rather of necessity and unavoidable commands.' And again, " man," says he, ‘ is carried both to good and evil by free motions;' ‘if God, by using a divine energy and virtue, (that is, an unfrustrable operation,) should turn the mind of every man to good works, his goodness would not be the fruit of counsel or praiseworthy,' ' but rather of necessity.' “And if God had dealt thus with man at the beginning, and afterwards (that is, after the fall,) subjected him, to necessary turns (to vice or virtue,) and unavoidable concupiscence or lusting,' how can he be freed from blame”?
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