Response to Turretinfan on Calvinism and Determinism

Turretinfan responded to my post on Calvinism and Determinism. (link) The purpose of my post was to point out that Calvinists are determinists and exhort people to check not only their soteriology but also their philosophy against scripture. Turretinfan’s response is odd, because at first he at first tries to put some space between himself and determinism, but then he argues forcefully for determinism and against libertarianism (the opposite of determinism). I didn’t intend the term “determinist” to be a pejorative, and if one is a determinist, I have no idea why they should be ashamed of it. As for Turretinfan’s concern that people don’t understand determinism or the subcategories that fit under the umbrella of determinism, I suggest the solution is not hiding facts, but rather examining them. Let’s examine the supposed “inaccuracies” of my post. TF: GIMJ claims that Calvinism teaches, "Our destiny is determined before we were born without having anything to do with us." This is not true, because "without having anything to do with us," is not an accurate representation. God appointed not only the ends but also the means. We are not chosen to glory because of something good in us, but we are chosen to be saved through faith in the Messiah. I wasn’t denying that under Calvinism, God appoints the means. If anything, this idea makes Calvinism even more deterministic, not less so. This is exhaustive determinism. But I didn’t consider the means relevant because Calvinism teaches that God decrees the end logically prior to the means. All I was saying was that under Calvinism, we are not the reason God chooses us. TF: GIMJ claims that Calvinism teaches, "The "possibility" of salvation [based on the sufficiency of Christ's death] is based on a different past then the actual past ... ." This is not true, either, because the sufficiency of Christ's death is a matter of intrinsic value. Christ's death is in actuality sufficient for all the sins of each and every person. Yes, but I suspect that your very concept of “actual sufficiency” with respect to a counterfactual future (i.e. the salvation of the non-elect) entails a counterfactual past. When determinists claim we are able to do otherwise, if we had chosen to, or we are able to choose otherwise, if we had wanted to; they are defining “ability” in terms of a counterfactual past. For more please see here. Can Christ save the reprobate? Under Calvinism, in one sense He can and in another sense He cannot. The sense He cannot is obvious. Given the Father didn’t elect them, Christ would almost have to “freak out” and run contrary to the Father to do so. Obviously that can’t happen. But the sense in which He can relies on a counterfactual past in which they were not reprobate. TF: GIMJ's loose criticisms of Calvinism apply to classical Arminianism/Molinism as well. GIMJ complains that "Our destiny is determined before we were born without having anything to do with us" is "clearly deterministic" but "our destiny is determined before we were born WITH having something to do with us," is no less deterministic. Molinism is a side issue, and has nothing to do with Calvinists being determinists or not. That said, I don’t mind a good rabbit trail. A few preliminaries on Molinism… Here’s some background info on the history of Molinism (link). The general idea is that the Molinist/Dominican controversy was the freewill/determinist debate within the Catholic church. The controversy subsided when the Pope said either view is allowable and to stop calling each other heretics. Arminius, a member of the Dutch Reformed Church, adopted some Molinist concepts and the Calvinist reaction to Arminian/Molinism led to Dort. Molinism reconciles libertarian free will and God’s providence by noting that man has freewill and God knows what we would do under any given circumstance. Often, Molinism is accused of being obscure “you have to be a genius to understand it…” but in reality, the basics are simple. The explanation of Molinism and positive arguments in favor of Molinism are fairly straight forward. What gets complex fast is the defense of Molinism from complex attacks. Turretinfan started with some complex anti-Molinist, arguments, so I thought I should lay a bit of foundation before getting into the weeds. The first thing to note about Turretinfan’s points on Molinism is that the current reaction to Molinism has done a 180 from the historic reactions. Today, people claim that the distinctions between Molinism and determinism are so subtle (if they are distinctions at all) that Molinism is a “veiled determinism”. Arminius and Molina were not charged with “veiled determinism”, they were charged with heresy. Arminius’ opponents were sharp cookies (Gomorus, Perkins, Junius…), and they understood that what Arminius was saying was different than their view; radically different. Is Molinism really determinism? Classic and current objectors to Molinism disagree. On to TF’s specific comments… TF: "Our destiny is determined before we were born without having anything to do with us" is "clearly deterministic" but "our destiny is determined before we were born WITH having something to do with us," is no less deterministic. That would be true, but Molinists deny predeterminism. Rather we teach predestination. In general, predestination is about “the plan” or “the goal” and predeterminism is how that goal is obtained. Perhaps you didn’t mean that Molinists teach predeterminism, but rather you meant that Molinism leads to predeterminism. But in that case you would need to form a reductio ad absurdum argument (link). TF: GIMJ complains that "The "possibility" of salvation is based on a different past then the actual past" is "a hallmark of determinism" but since Arminianism/Molinism affirms God's prior knowledge of all history to come, any "possibility" of salvation for any person who will not be saved must be based on a past in which God knew something different than what he knows - i.e. a different past than the actual past. Fair warning, this argument has some hair on it… Counterfactual pasts are not a distinctive of Molinism. Many libertarians that affirm God’s foreknowledge hold to some sort of “counterfactual past”. But there’s a difference between this and the determinist counterfactual past. As noted above, the determinist definition of the ability to do otherwise entails a counterfactual past. In libertarianism it does not. Rather, the hypothetical that man uses their ability entails a hypothetical counterfactual past. Again, in determinism, there is a definitional relationship between the actual ability and a hypothetical past. In libertarianism, the relationship is between the hypothetical future and the hypothetical past. This distinction makes libertarians suspect that the determinist’s ability is not actual, but rather hypothetical. Further, in determinism the counterfactuals in the counterfactual past are causal forces influencing the person. In libertarianism the counterfactuals are not causal forces influencing the person, but rather things that are logically (but not causally) dependent on the persons’ future choice. TF: GIMJ complains that "Denying contrary choice is another sign of determinism" but classical Arminianism/Molinism admits that God himself is unable to choose evil. If that is a sign of determinism, classical Arminianism/Molinism has it at the highest level. God has contrary choice between good options. Same goes for us when we get to heaven. The unregenerate, without grace, can only choose between bad options. For more, please see here. TF: In conclusion, I wasn't impressed by the post. I am generally unimpressive. You on the other hand, are not a novice on Calvinism. Do you consider yourself a determinist and if so, what type of determinist are you? For a technical explanation of determinism see here and for general info on how a wide variety of info on how people use the term, please see here. =-) God be with you, Dan