Objection 25: Conversion uncertain – Whitby’s refutation of Arguments in favor of irresistible grace
IX. OBJECTION TWENTY-FIVE. Lastly, it is objected, "that the opinion which makes the grace of God resistible, leaves it uncertain whether any one will be converted by it, or not."
ANSWER FIRST. To this I answer, that it leaves it as uncertain whether any one will be unconverted, or not; and surely, that opinion which affords this encouragement to all, that God, notwithstanding their fall, will afford means sufficient to convert them, if they do not neglect and refuse to use them, is much to be preferred before that which tells them he hath from eternity passed an act of preterition on them, and by that excluded them out of the number of the elect, that is, of them who only shall be saved.
ANSWER SECOND. A man may, notwithstanding this opinion, be infallibly certain, otherwise, that many will be found true converts at the last, because he knows that many have already died in the fear of God, and in the faith of Christ, and because the holy scriptures do assure us that ' some shall arise to everlasting life, and receive the end of their faith in the salvation of their souls'
ANSWER THIRD. To say that "it is barely possible in the nature of the thing that none may be converted," hath no inconvenience in it, because it tends not to hinder any man's endeavors after his conversion, any more than the like possibility, — that no man may thrive by his industry, or grow rich by his trading, or have a safe voyage at sea, or a plentiful crop by sowing, or health by taking medicine, — hinders men from doing any of these actions.
It is no imputation upon divine wisdom, that God himself complains he had given his law to the Jews in vain; nor did St. Paul conceive it any defect in the grace of God, that it might be received in vain by the churches of Corinth, (2 Corinthians 6:1) of Galatia, (Galatians 6:4) and of Thessalonica, (1 Thessalonians 3:5) and, by parity of reason, by all other churches. It is possible, that no one " subject may obey the laws of his superior, because they have freewill, and may do evil under the strongest obligations to do well; but should the world be left therefore without human laws, or be governed by irresistible force, or not at all? Nay, rather that freedom which includes a bare possibility that all may disobey, proves the wisdom and justice of governing mankind by laws attended with moral inducements to obedience. Whereas if we suppose men to be under a necessity either of doing what is required, or of doing the contrary, it is very hard to understand how governing them by moral means should be wise in the former case, or just in the latter.
ANSWER FIRST. To this I answer, that it leaves it as uncertain whether any one will be unconverted, or not; and surely, that opinion which affords this encouragement to all, that God, notwithstanding their fall, will afford means sufficient to convert them, if they do not neglect and refuse to use them, is much to be preferred before that which tells them he hath from eternity passed an act of preterition on them, and by that excluded them out of the number of the elect, that is, of them who only shall be saved.
ANSWER SECOND. A man may, notwithstanding this opinion, be infallibly certain, otherwise, that many will be found true converts at the last, because he knows that many have already died in the fear of God, and in the faith of Christ, and because the holy scriptures do assure us that ' some shall arise to everlasting life, and receive the end of their faith in the salvation of their souls'
ANSWER THIRD. To say that "it is barely possible in the nature of the thing that none may be converted," hath no inconvenience in it, because it tends not to hinder any man's endeavors after his conversion, any more than the like possibility, — that no man may thrive by his industry, or grow rich by his trading, or have a safe voyage at sea, or a plentiful crop by sowing, or health by taking medicine, — hinders men from doing any of these actions.
It is no imputation upon divine wisdom, that God himself complains he had given his law to the Jews in vain; nor did St. Paul conceive it any defect in the grace of God, that it might be received in vain by the churches of Corinth, (2 Corinthians 6:1) of Galatia, (Galatians 6:4) and of Thessalonica, (1 Thessalonians 3:5) and, by parity of reason, by all other churches. It is possible, that no one " subject may obey the laws of his superior, because they have freewill, and may do evil under the strongest obligations to do well; but should the world be left therefore without human laws, or be governed by irresistible force, or not at all? Nay, rather that freedom which includes a bare possibility that all may disobey, proves the wisdom and justice of governing mankind by laws attended with moral inducements to obedience. Whereas if we suppose men to be under a necessity either of doing what is required, or of doing the contrary, it is very hard to understand how governing them by moral means should be wise in the former case, or just in the latter.
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