Book/Article Reviews

Abasciano on Paul's Use of the OT in Romans 9:10-18
The Fathers Know Best on the Pope
Abasciano Clearing Up Miss-conceptions About Corporate Election
Chisholm Anatomy of an Anthropomorphism: Does God Discover Facts?
Watson on Omniscience
Dunn's Discourse on the Freedom of the Will
Hamilton The Order of Faith and Election in the Gospel of John
Book Review: Rowe - Can God be Free?
Chrystostom On the Drawing and Giving in John 6
Edgars the Meaning of Foreknow
Wesley on Acts 13:48
Book Review: Whedon on the Freedom of the Will
Mcknight on the Hebrew Warning Passages
Kleins - Paul's use of Kalein
Brian Abasciano’s Corporate Election in Romans 9: A Reply to Thomas Schreiner
Book Review: Man's Faith and Freedom

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Responsibility - Evaluation of Arminian Grounds for LFW

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Scripture and Philosophy

Steve Hays added his thoughts to a discussion I had with Paul Manata on choice and determinism . Steve says: Dan fails to distinguish between semantic equivocation and conceptual equivocation. Between the meaning of words and the meaning of ideas.The compatibilist/incompatibilist debate is fundamentally a debate over the concept of freedom, not the meaning of words in a dictionary. This seems like a key issue, because it moves the debate away from exegesis to philosophy. The question is not if philosophy is permissible and useful in theology. I am not opposing all philosophy; only the practice of reading technical philosophical definitions into scripture. Nor is the question if setting up technical definitions is normal philosophical behavior. But philosophy can be discussed in ordinary language by “tight wording” and specificity. Indeed scripture discusses philosophy in common language. To show that I have no hard feelings towards setting up special definitions in philosophical ...
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