Dan Chapa

Nathanael P. Taylor is posting a series on Molinism ( link ) Here’s his description of Molinism. In Molinism, it’s been true through all eternity past that if I were in a circumstance C, then I would have faith in Christ. Logically, this means that it was true prior to God choosing to create this actual world. However, this just happens to be true—it is a contingent truth. In other words, something different could have been true from all eternity past. The counterfactual that if I were in a circumstance then I would have faith in Christ could have either been truth or false. Suppose this counterfactual statement turned out true—you might ask, “What makes this counterfactual true or false?” And the answer is that nothing makes it true. The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are just true from all eternity past and, oddly, nothing makes them true. God can’t make them true because that would mean God has control over the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, resembling Calvinism....

Turretinfan recently posted on Dr. Anderson’s argument that on Molinism God’s decrees are fallible, because we can choose otherwise than God decrees. ( link to Turretinfan’s post ; link to Dr. Anderson’s post ).  But Dr. Craig pointed out that if the person would have chosen otherwise, God’s decrees would have been different.  Dr. Anderson then called this solution a “special pleading” and argued Molinists should not be allowed to exclude God’s decree.  His supporting reasons were 1) God’s decree implies we will not do otherwise (he called this a relative logical necessity) and 2) God’s decree has causal consequences.  Turretinfan accepts Dr. Anderson’s arguments and adds that sometimes prophesies are self-fulfilling (i.e. a prophesied victory motivates troops to fight).     This is a complex business but fortunately the answer is simple.  Here’s a chart explaining Molinism: Dr. Ande...

James White recently discussed middle knowledge on the Dividing Line.  Here's an audio response:  Link

Steve recently asked: " I've been thinking about Matthew 11:21-23 as a non-Calvinist. If God knew the people in Tyre and Sidon (or other places) would repent under certain circumstances, why did not God bring about those circumstances? E.g. do the mighty works there ." The passage states: 21 “ Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. 22 But I say to you, it will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment than for you. 23 And you, Capernaum, who are exalted to heaven, will be brought down to Hades; for if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. Christ is rebuking Bethsaida and Chorazin for their stubborn unrepentance in light of His mighty works and witness among them.  So the question amounts to, why did the Father send Christ to the Jews knowing t...

Hopefully this blog is helpful on middle knowledge ( middle knowledge tag ) But here’s a bunch more resources. Molina, Luis de , Alfred Freddoso Molinism , Alfred Freddoso A Molinist View of Election Or How to Be a Consistent Infralapsarian , by Ken Keatherly Ducking Friendly Fire: Davison on the Grounding Objection , William Lane Craig Middle Knowledge, Truth–Makers, and the "Grounding Objection" , William Lane Craig 'Men Moved By The Holy Spirit Spoke From God' (2 Peter 1.21): A Middle Knowledge Perspective on Biblical Inspiration , William Lane Craig "Lest Anyone Should Fall": A Middle Knowledge Perspective on Perseverance and Apostolic Warnings , William Lane Craig Molinism and Romans 9 , William Lane Craig Grace, Actual and Habitual: A Dogmatic Treatise (especially chapter 3) , Joseph Pohle, Arthur Preuss Natural Theology (especially book 2, chapter 4), by Bernard Boedder A collection of tracts concerning predestination and pro...

Recently I had separate conversations with Steve Hays and Turretinfan both of which got down to the charge that "you're using philosophical speculation, I am using scripture".  A serious charge, this; one wants his theology to be grounded in scripture rather than floating away via the levitating power of thin air. However, faith and reason are often intertwined; can you even trust scripture's words without trusting your eyes, ears and brain more than some philosophers are willing to do? We all have philosophies whether we are aware of them or not. My comments in blue; Steve and Turretinfan's comments in red. ------------------------------ http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2012/12/outside-camp.html Steve: Then I read a book by Jerry Walls and David Baggett which says my God could command people to torture little children for the fun of it. When I read that, it doesn’t hurt my feelings. It doesn’t offend me. But it does alienate me. It instantly dissolves an...

But I know that the king of Egypt will not let you go unless compelled by a mighty hand. (Exodus 3:19) Pharaoh wouldn't let the Hebrews go - not out of love for God or the Hebrews.  Not from guilt or respect or fear or reason or wisdom.  No, it took force.  And how did God know that all non-forceful ways would not lead Pharaoh to let the Hebrews go?  Because He knows what anyone would choose under any circumstances.  This passages support for middle knowledge is less famous then say, Matthew 11:21, but it is more broad.  God knew that a vast array of options Moses could have tried would not lead Pharaoh to freely release the Hebrews.  

The Scholastics used to ask “does predestination place anything in the predestined?” A relevant question indeed concerning Acts 4:28. Consider the translation change from the 1984 NIV to the 2012 ISV: “They did what your power and will had decided beforehand should happen.” 1984 New International Version “to carry out everything that your hand and will had predetermined to take place” 2012 International Standard Version The NIV speaks of God’s choice – a mental resolution on His part – the ISV speaks of God’s actions impacting and determining the events. In the NIV, God’s mind is set; in the ISV the events are set. The Greek term proorizo is flexible in either direction – both translations are permissible. Yet the ISV clarifies the ambiguous term in favor of Calvinism. The argument for determinism based on the ISV is simple – God predetermined sinful actions for which man is morally responsible, therefore compatible determinism is true. But this argument is not quite so ...

Deuteronomy 7:3-4 Do not intermarry with them. Do not give your daughters to their sons or take their daughters for your sons, for they will turn your sons away from following me to serve other gods, and the LORD's anger will burn against you and will quickly destroy you. 1 Kings 11:2, 9 They were from nations about which the LORD had told the Israelites, "You must not intermarry with them, because they will surely turn your hearts after their gods." Nevertheless, Solomon held fast to them in love.... verse 9  The LORD became angry with Solomon because his heart had turned away from the LORD, the God of Israel, who had appeared to him twice. God uses His middle knowledge to warn people. If you put yourself into a given circumstance, you will do this.  God knew what would happen if the Israelites intermarried.  He knew what the foreign wives would do and how the Israelites would respond.  Sadly, Solomon didn't listen. On divine determinism,...

Being associated with the Pharisees is normally unflattering.  But considering Paul was originally a Pharisee, it's important to understand what they believed.  And they maintained God's providential control and man's freedom in a way only Molinists today can.  Here's how Josephus described the Pharisees view: 3. Now, for the Pharisees, ... when they determine that all things are done by fate, they do not take away the freedom from men of acting as they think fit; since their notion is, that it hath pleased God to make a temperament, whereby what he wills is done, but so that the will of man can act virtuously or viciously. http://www.sacred-texts.com/jud/josephus/ant-18.htm the Pharisees are those who are esteemed most skillful in the exact explication of their laws, and introduce the first sect. These ascribe all to fate [or providence], and to God, and yet allow, that to act what is right, or the contrary, is principally in the power of men, although f...

Luis De Molina is often called the inventor of the idea that God knows what we would choose in any setting.  But Molina’s role is really more of a systematizer and defender of this idea, rather than inventor.  Of course, the idea is in the bible itself ( link ), but it’s also in some of the Church Fathers.  For example, Gregory of Nyssa uses this idea to theorize why God allows infants to die.  Now Gregory’s use is somewhat speculative and may not be all that helpful to grieving parents (“Oh great, not only is my kid dead, but he would have grown up to be a Hitler…”).  So I don’t bring this up to sign off on Gregory’s theory, but rather mealy to note the use of the idea in the Fathers, well prior to Molina’s time.  Here’s Gregory of Nyssa’s comment: "It is a sign of the perfection of God's providence, that He not only heals maladies that have come into existence, but also provides that some should be never mixed up at all in the things which...

All quotes from Eef Dekker’s Was Arminius a Molinist? The Sixteenth Century Journal, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer, 1996), pp. 337-352.  Arminius: The knowledge of God is a faculty of his life, which is the first in nature and order, by which he distinctly understands each and every thing, whatever entity they have, will have, have had, can have, or might hypothetically have, and of each and every thing their order, connection, and various aspects that they have or can have; not even excluded that entity which belongs to reason, and which only in the mind, imagination or enunciation exists or can exist. (Public Disputation IV.30) Dekker: … "Hypothetical entity" may sound just the same as "possible entity." There is, however, a weighty reason not to regard it as such. It is one of the characteristic features of Molinism to distinguish that which is possible from that which can hypothetically exist. In the first case it is about things that can exist, in the seco...

All quotes from Richard Muller’s God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy. Baker Book House, 1991. By way of repudiating the Reformed view, Arminius would not only adopt a concept of scientia media, he would also argue an alternative view of concurrence…. Walaeus notes, however, that this hypothetical knowing is not necessarily to be understood as a third kind of knowledge separate from the scientia simplicis intelligentiae.  Arminius argues precisely the point that the definitions offered by his Reformed contemporaries have purposely excluded.  After his basic set of definitions, Arminius presents the thesis that: The Scholastics say besides, that one kind of God’s knowledge is natural and necessary, another free, and a third intermediate (mediam).  (1) Natural or necessary knowledge is that by which God understands himself and all possibilities; (2) free know...

Simon Episcopius led the Remonstants at Dort, after Arminius’ death. ( link for background on Episcopius ) Like Arminius, he held to middle knowledge. ( link ) Here’s what he had to say about middle knowledge: This order to be rightly understood, has come to be observed, by usually attributing to God threefold knowledge. One which is necessary and practical and is called simple intelligence, which by its nature is prior to all free acts of [the divine] will, which God has of himself and knows all possibilities. The other free, which is called vision, and is after the free act of the [divine] will, by which God has decreed to do or permit all things, knows the same order, when it decided to make or permit to be done. Third, Middle, by which God knows what men or angels would do by their own freedom, under conditions, if with these or those circumstances, in this or that state, or established order. Whether this distinction is rightly said of the divine knowledge, we do not consid...

Genesis 15:5-6: He took him outside and said, “Look up at the sky and count the stars—if indeed you can count them.” Then he said to him, “So shall your offspring be. Abram believed the Lord, and he credited it to him as righteousness. What a monumental event. Did God foreknow Abram’s belief? Most Christians say yes. The question I would like to ask is, is such a belief consistent with simple foreknowledge? Simple foreknowledge is the view that God simply knows the future. Those who hold to simple foreknowledge are not divine determinists; they hold to libertarian freedom. Likewise they are not Molinists, God does not have middle knowledge (the idea that God knows what people would choose in various settings). Also they are not open theists, they believe God has exhaustive foreknowledge. They say God simply knows the future.  But simple foreknowledge is providentially useless. Consider the grandfather paradox (i.e. you go back in time an kill your own grandfather). Simi...

The twin foundations for middle knowledge are the beliefs that the bible teaches libertarian free will and the bible teaches God's providence over all things.   Middle knowledge reconciles the two by stating that God knows what we would choose under any circumstance and He uses this knowledge to accomplish His goals without removing man's freedom.  In middle knowledge, God primarily uses His knowledge rather than His power to achieve His ends.   Middle knowledge gets the name middle, because God's knowledge of what would happen is logically after God's knowledge of what can happen and logically before His decision and knowledge of what will happen.  So for example, God knows if you are in an ice cream shop today you could choose chocolate or vanilla, and you would choose chocolate and He decides to let you choose chocolate so He permits you to be in the ice cream shop today knowing you will choose chocolate.   Man's freedom is preserved in that God does not deci...

Steve Hays recently launched a series of anti-Molinism arguments, mostly in response to William Lane Craig’s defense of Molinism here . Steve’s first criticism of Molinism is to call it fate and fatalistic, because in Molinism God does not decide what we would freely do in various circumstances.   ( link ) Steve doesn’t explain why this qualifies as fatalism.   Was the Cowboys selection of Tryon Smith fatalistic just because the first eight players were off the board?   No, just because you don’t decide everything does not mean you cannot decide anything or that the outcome of what you do choose is inevitable.   While God does not determine what we would choose in various circumstances, He does decide the circumstances.   Steve is confusing the inability to determine everything with the inability to determine anything. Steve’s second criticism of Molinsim is that “ So not only must God play the hand he’s been dealt, but he was dealt that hand from a fictit...

I upated the wikipedia page on Molinism .  This is my first time working on wikipedia so I will be interested to see if it stay's updated as the prior version seem to have been written by a Calvinist then updated by an Open Theist.  Anyways, I hope you enjoy it! 

James White recently spoke about middle knowledge and William Lane Craig on ‘ Radio Free Geneva ’. Some of the program repeated past mistakes James White has made about middle knowledge, but he provided some fresh mistakes as well; the most notable of which was his statement around 42 minutes in that “ the best the Molinist can say is that God has nothing to do with anything that takes place in time because He is a huge divine cosmic computer that ran all the possible scenarios based upon what free creatures would do and actuated a scenario ” and again two minutes latter, James White says “[per Molinism] the freedom of God’s choice is limited to one decision, that’s it .” In Molinism, just as in Calvinism, God’s one decision is all comprehensive and has multiple aspects. His decision impacts (either directly or via permission) all points in time, so it’s fundamentally wrong to say God has nothing to do with anything that takes place in time. Just because God planned for the flood fro...

In Steve Hays' response to William Lane Craig ( here ), he raised some arguments against Molinism, which I have been attempting to address. This post is a continuation of our exchange. So the Molinist God instantiates a sinful world even though he hates sin, and sin is unnecessary. Doesn’t sound very coherent to me. Much less a promising theodicy. It’s no contradiction or incoherence to permit something you hate, so long as you have good reason to do so. I suppose one could read a contradiction into this by understanding 'instantiates' in some way that denies or undermines LFW. Yes, God is willing to permit sin to obtain the greater good. What’s the theodicean value of the adjective (“ultimately”) in relation to the noun (“sin”)? How does the adjective magically exculpate God on Molinist grounds? On Molinist grounds, ultimate responsibility is essential to moral culpability. Sometimes people are responsible for the downstream consequences of what they do when they are ulti...