Dan Chapa

 

Genesis 15:5-6: He took him outside and said, “Look up at the sky and count the stars—if indeed you can count them.” Then he said to him, “So shall your offspring be. Abram believed the Lord, and he credited it to him as righteousness. What a monumental event. Did God foreknow Abram’s belief? Most Christians say yes. The question I would like to ask is, is such a belief consistent with simple foreknowledge? Simple foreknowledge is the view that God simply knows the future. Those who hold to simple foreknowledge are not divine determinists; they hold to libertarian freedom. Likewise they are not Molinists, God does not have middle knowledge (the idea that God knows what people would choose in various settings). Also they are not open theists, they believe God has exhaustive foreknowledge. They say God simply knows the future.  But simple foreknowledge is providentially useless. Consider the grandfather paradox (i.e. you go back in time an kill your own grandfather). Simi...

In James White’s book, The Potter’s Freedom 1 , he argues for unconditional election based on Romans 8:28-30.   Here's the passage:   Romans 8:28-30: And we know that all things work together for good to those who love God, to those who are the called according to His purpose. 29 For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren. 30 Moreover whom He predestined, these He also called; whom He called, these He also justified; and whom He justified, these He also glorified. One of the key questions is the meaning of the word foreknow (proginosko).  James White says that foreknowledge means “ chooses to enter into a relationship with ”.  He supports this view by arguing that to determine the meaning of the Greek term proginosko, we should primarily use passages where God is the subject and the object is personal (such as Romans 11:2, 1 Peter 1:20).  He argues “ Obviou...

Here's William Hasker's version of the foreknowledge argument. (B1) It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (Premise) (B2) It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false, or fail to believe anything that is true. (Premise: divine omniscience) (B3) Therefore, God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 1, 2) (B4) If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone's power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing. (Premise: the unalterability of the past) (B5) Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to bring it about that God has not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast. (From 3, 4) (B6) It is not possible for it to be true both that God has always believed that Clarence would have a cheese omelet for breakfast, and that he does not in fact have one. (From 2) (B7) Therefore, it is not in Clarence...

Traditionally, Libertarians have guarded the definition of free will very closely. Libertarians don't allow compatiblists to remove essential aspects from the concept of free will, like say, reducing ability to hypothetical ability. But while we maintain constant vigilance against compatibilist reductions to free will, it seems to me we are less aware of needless and harmful additions to the concept of free will; additions that may be just as damaging as compatibilist reductions. Both Arminians and Open Theists frequently use the term free will, but do we mean the same thing by it? Compatibilist reductions to free will are subtle; saying we are able to do otherwise, meaning we are able to do otherwise if we want to . Likewise, Open Theists may have subtle and dangerous additions to free will.

Certainty properly is not an affection of an existing thing or of one about to happen, but of the mind certainly knowing or foreknowing that the thing exists or is about to exist: whence a transference is made to the event, -for it is the same that a thing will happen, and that it will certainly happen, -but that it may be signified to another that there is no reason to doubt of the event coming to pass. But necessity is an affection of the being, and adds a mode to the event, by which it is said that a thing will happen necessarily, and is opposed to the mode which is called "contingency". Therefore the same idea is not expressed, when it is said that a thing will happen certainly and necessarily; for the one word is only about futurition, the other about the mode also of futurition. This necessity is that of the consequent, by which a thing exists from its antecedent beginning and cause, so that it cannot not-exist from it: to which is opposed the contingency of the consequ...

However, the action itself must not be counted among the things that are necessary for acting. This is evident per se, since otherwise one would not be asserting anything special about the causes under discussion; instead, one wold be making a claim that to all things - not only to all agents but to all entities as well- namely, that if they have a form whereby they are constituted with such and such an esse or under such an such a notion, then the consequent that they are of that sort follows necessarily. For just as if someone has whiteness, then he is necessarily white, so too if someone exercises an action, then he necessarily effects something-where this is merely the necessity of the consequence (as they say): that is, a conditioned necessity, and not the necessity of the consequent-that is, an absolute necessity. The former kind of necessity is irrelevant in the present context, since causes cannot be distinguished with respect to it. 1 Therefore, in order for the discussion to...

“When addressing the question of whether it is within one’s power to prevent some future event, it is important to keep clear that the distinction between the sensus divisus and the sensus composites. In sensu composito I cannot prevent a future event, for this is self-contradictory. But in sensu diviso I can prevent some future event, for I have contra-causal power to bring about future events. Similarly it is not within one’s power to postvent a past event in sensu composito because this is self-contaditory. Since backward causation is metaphysically impossible, we do not generally have it within our power to affect the past even is sensu division, thus generating our intuitions of the unalterability of the past as over against the future. But where what is past is conditioned by what is future (for example, future contingent propositions’ being antecedently true), I have the power to act in such a way that the past would have been different than it in fact was. (Craig. Divine Forekn...

“The second error has to do with the composed sense, namely, we should not claim that because the divine foreknowledge already exists beforehand, Peter is in reality not able not to sin, as if because of the preesisting divine knowledge he has lost something of his freedom and power not to sin in reality, should he so will. For I would not hesitate to call this sort of interpretation an error from the point of view of the faith. Indeed, even though that knowledge did exist beforehand, it was just as truly within his power not to sin as it would have been had that knowledge not existed, and he was just as truly able to refrain from the act in light of which he was foreknown to be a future sinner as he would have been had that knowledge not existed, as has been explained; thus this interpretation is not the one that the theologians have in mind. Rather, they are claiming, absolutely correctly, that given the divine foreknowledge, Peter is not able in the composed sense not to sin, becaus...

Moreover, for an understanding of the objections it must be noted, that there is a twofold necessity, namely, the absolute, and the respective. An absolute necessity, which is opposed to contingency, is said (to be) the necessity of the consequent. A respective necessity is said (to be) the necessity of the consequence, and this is not opposed to the contingent. For something contingent necessarily follows, so that if one walks, it necessarily follows, that he moves. It must be said, therefore, that in the foreknown there is no absolute necessity, but only (a necessity) of consequence, because there necessarily follows: ‘God foreknows this, therefore this will be’.... 4. To that which is objected per impossibile, that if it could be otherwise, It could fail; it must be said, that1 falsehood [falsitas] comes from the discord of an intellect regarding the cognized, similarly the potency to fail [potential fallendi] from the potency to be discordant [potential discordandi]. Therefore, I s...

But regarding that, which has been said above, namely that God’s Foreknowledge cannot fail, it was customarily opposed by certain (authors) in this manner: God foreknew this one (was) going to read, and/or something of this kind; but it can be, that he does not read: therefore it can be otherwise than God foreknew, therefore God’s foreknowledge can fail. — Which is entirely false. Of course it can (be) that something does not come to be, and yet that it has been foreknown to come to be; yet for this reason God’s Foreknowledge cannot fail, because if that were not to come to be, neither would it have been foreknown by God to come to be. But they still urge the question saying: either it can come to be [fieri] otherwise, than God has foreknown, or not otherwise; if not otherwise: therefore necessarily all shall turn out (as God foreknows it) [cuncta eveniunt]; if, however, otherwise: therefore God’s Foreknowledge can fail and/or be changed. But it can come to be otherwise, because it can...

Below are two recent exchanges I had with Paul Manata and Ron Di Gacomo on foreknowledge and freedom; specifically the argument from the necessity of the past. In both I argued that the classic argument based on the necessity of the past conflates truths and the basis of truth; there's a difference between me and propositions about me. In Paul's case I asked him to try to reformulate the argument, but he declined. In Ron's case I tried to reformulate the argument for him and he rejected my reformulation. Either way, these exchanges lead me to be more convinced of my hunch that the classic formulation is a train wreck in light of the distinction between truth and the basis of truth. I will be in blue; Paul and Ron in red. Exchange with Paul: The ability to do ~A being consistent with God's forebelief that you will A strikes me as obviously false given the foreknowledge argument. In the least, that's what is up for debate. Apparently, what you mean is that you hav...

Richard Watson's article on Omniscience (a part of his systematic theology) discusses God's knowledge and foreknowledge . Watson starts out by providing the scriptural passages indicating that God's knowledge is infinite. He then provides arguments from reason supporting God's infinite knowledge; namely, from God's being the First Cause, from His wisdom displayed in His works and finally from Greek philosophers who conclude God is omniscient based on the light of nature and express themselves well, so long as they expressed themselves generally, on this subject. Next Watson takes on the idea that God does not know our future choices; either because He doesn't choose to or because such foreknowledge implies a contradiction. Watson destroys this idea with scripture on prophecies of future choices and demonstrates what damage this does to God's providence. Then Watson reconciles God's foreknowledge with human freedom by pointing out the difference ...

In Dunn's article, A Discourse on the Freedom of the Will he dispatches Jonathan Edwards two main arguments in a quick and decisive manor. He responses to Edwards' cause of a volition dilemma (infinite regression of causes or causeless cause) by pointing out that Edwards begs the question regarding the definition and nature of causes and that his argument undermines God's freedom. Following Edwards' principles, Dunn argues: therefore there never was a divine volition without a pre-existing motive. Hence there was a time when there was no force in the universe, but the force of motive; and when there either was no God, or else no active God. If we take one horn of the dilemma, and say there was a God, but a God without volition, and consequently without activity or character, we have the Pantheist's God. If we take the other, and affirm that previous to volition there was no intelligent God, we have the God of the Atheist. In either case, the universe presents but...

Middle Knowledge The purpose of this post is to define and defend God’s middle knowledge (otherwise known as Molinism after it's first articulator Luis de Molina). Middle knowledge has been underappreciated in theological circles. This is surprising, given that it makes the most progress out of any system at reconciling freewill and predestination. The reasons typically given for not adopting the middle knowledge solution are the grounds for such knowledge, the complexity of the system, and its relative newness to the scene. However, its value is immense, explaining God’s full control, while maintaining libertarian freewill. Francis Turretin, reformer and Professor of Theology and Philosophy at the school Calvin founded at Geneva, is often cited as the authority on the reformed position. He wrote an important systematic theology, in which he assailed the Arminian and Jesuit position on middle knowledge. Being one of the best anti-middle knowledge writings available, I chose to defe...