Dan Chapa

In Dunn's article, A Discourse on the Freedom of the Will he dispatches Jonathan Edwards two main arguments in a quick and decisive manor. He responses to Edwards' cause of a volition dilemma (infinite regression of causes or causeless cause) by pointing out that Edwards begs the question regarding the definition and nature of causes and that his argument undermines God's freedom. Following Edwards' principles, Dunn argues: therefore there never was a divine volition without a pre-existing motive. Hence there was a time when there was no force in the universe, but the force of motive; and when there either was no God, or else no active God. If we take one horn of the dilemma, and say there was a God, but a God without volition, and consequently without activity or character, we have the Pantheist's God. If we take the other, and affirm that previous to volition there was no intelligent God, we have the God of the Atheist. In either case, the universe presents but...

John Wagner recently edited and republished Daniel Whedon’s Freedom of the Will: A Wesleyan response to Jonathan Edwards . The book is an outstanding refutation of Edward’s Inquiry into the Will. Whedon seeks and engages top authors and arguments like Hobbs’ argument (latter adopted by Locke and Edwards) that free will is incoherent, because it either amounts to a causeless cause or infinite regression of causes. Whedon responds by pointing out 1) the will is the cause of choice (74), 2) defining indeterministic causes (38-39) and 3) explaining that indeterministic causes account for either choice (71-72). In other words, indeterministic causes explain the goal of our choices (or reason for our choices), but in the will is the cause we choose this goal, not that goal. This is essentially agent causation. Whedon’s discussion of foreknowledge is fascinating. His refutation of Edwards' God's foreknowledge rules out freewill argument is solid. I like his pointing out that we ...

Steve provided another post in our exchange on choice and determinism. Steve: a) A Calvinist doesn’t define the meaning of the word “choice” in terms “You can choose X if it’s your strongest desire.”b) For that matter, a Calvinist doesn’t even have to define the concept of choice in terms of “You can choose X if it’s your strongest desire.”The basic idea of choosing is simply to make a decision. I didn’t say Calvinists define choose as “You can choose X if it’s your strongest desire”, I said they avoid the common sense definitions and use exotic, philosophical counter-definitions; like the ones Paul provided. But Calvinists seem to have at least three options: 1) inconsistently hold to common sense definitions, 2) exotic, philosophical counter-definitions, or 3) use boiled down definitions that are missing some (or all) of the essential ingredients in the common sense definitions. If one removes enough essential elements of a definition, they end up with a tautology (choose = choose). ...

Introduction Definitions Critique of Edwards’ View of the Will What is Libertarian Free Will? Edwards Arguments against Freewill Causeless Cause or Infinite Regression of Causes Divine foreknowledge Arguments against the Link between Freewill and Responsibility Impeccability and Hardening Commands and Invitations for the Impossible Desire isn't good enough Habits Evaluation of Grounds for Freewill Responsibility Action Common and Philosophical Necessity Fatalism Necessity of the Divine Will Wrap Up of Edwards Book Review Modern Reactions Free to Choose what we Desire Most? Debate with Turretinfan on God’s freewill

TF: The price is sufficient to save, but is not used to that end. Yes, but you speak of Christ’s death as if it’s only a value and not also a use of that value. TF: The act of offering is what makes the sacrifice efficient Owens says God lays the sins of the elect on Christ first, then Christ carries them to the cross and pays the price, actually satisfying justice through His death. The intention, sin transfer, offering, and acceptance are all required. Without them, Christ’s death would not, and could not save anyone. As it stands, you seem to hold to the contradiction that the value of Christ’s death is both sufficient and it requires something else. Me: "I had asked Turretinfan a question (well 2 questions) that he didn’t answer, so I will ask again: do you consider yourself a determinist and if so, what type of determinist are you?"TF: I think GIMJ needs to read my response more carefully. I indicated that under GIMJ's proffered definition of "determinism" ...

I wanted to wrap up this review of Edwards by discussing the roles of philosophy and scripture. Reviewing John Owen’s book lead me to dive into scripture. This book review was philosophical in nature, as was Edwards’ book. Although I enjoyed this book review, I miss digging into scripture. For the most part, Edwards makes his arguments either without appealing to scripture or only based on a cursory review of a passage. In fairness to Edwards he goes into scripture on two topics that we didn’t get into because I agree with him: divine foreknowledge and impeccability. But other than that Edwards barely touches scripture. But since Edwards is dealing with the broad topic of the will, his book impacts the way we interpret thousands of passages of scripture. Either Calvinists or Arminians are making a categorical mistake when it comes to the will. As I said in the beginning, if CFW is incoherent, LFW is biblical, and vice versa. Philosophy is useful for defining terms, clarifying issues ...

Everything is about God in one way shape or form. So my biggest problem with Edwards’ arguments regards the nature of God. Outline of Edwards' Arguments About the Necessity of the God's Will - Part IV.VII Arminians say that if God doesn’t have LFW, God is stuck in fate. The Arminian argument is based on the idea that LFW is a good thing, but acting according to nature is not disadvantageous – especially in God’s case where His nature is perfect. The sovereignty of God is in His ability and authority to do as He pleases. His power is infinite and His authority supreme. His will is not dependent on anything outside Himself, but it is determined by His infinite wisdom. God’s wisdom determines His will to what is most wise. Otherwise God is unwise, which is unworthy of God. Arminians themselves say God cannot choose contrary to the fitness of things due to His wisdom. If the fitness of things necessitating God’s actions doesn’t detract from His glory, neither does it detrac...

Edwards' Arguments In part IV.V and IV.VI Edwards discusses fatalism. He states that because Calvinists affirm the connection between means and the end, they are not fatalists. Further, Edwards has not studied Stoic philosophers, let alone craft his views to mirror theirs. My Reponses I admit fatalism is not one of my favorite arguments against Calvinism. Hyper-Calvinists do ignor means and get into trouble on this (i.e. not evangelizing), but not Calvinists. Perhaps there is something to it, but many arguments I see mix assumptions (i.e. a major premise from a Calvinist standpoint and then a minor from an Arminian standpoint). There is one semi-fatalistic argument that does make some sense to me. It‘s not about means, but rather commencement. If I am seated, I have to tell myself to stand up. The means/end in this case is telling myself to stand/standing. But if I thought I had to be acted upon in order to do so, I would just wait until I was acted upon. If my brain started tel...

Edwards’ arguments in part V.III and part V.IV Edwards splits necessity into two categories: natural and moral. Natural necessity relates to our actions, moral necessity relates to our wills. If an act is naturally necessary, it is either against or without our will, and whether we will or not the result is the same. Edwards says that natural necessity is the common meaning of necessity and moral necessity is philosophical. Natural necessity (common necessity) is a sense wholly different than that used in the Calvinist/Arminian debate. Most people go through their whole lives without thinking about moral necessity (philosophical necessity) and its relationship with responsibility. People use the terms “must, cannot, necessary, unable, impossible, unavoidable, and irresistible” signifying natural necessity. Natural necessity is incompatible with responsibility. The common notion of responsibility is A) doing what we please and B) what we please being wrong. Arminians equivocate common ...

Outline of Edwards’ arguments in part V.II Arminians say that without self-determining power, we have no power of action, acts are not our own, and we must be passive. This isn’t the way people use “action” in common speech. Used this way action is either causeless or an infinite regression of causes. When we speak of a first cause, if nothing causes something, nothing could prevent it, so therefore it is necessary. The common notion of action is the effects of the will. Arminians think of action as self-determination, because the motion of our bodies is caused by our wills – so they assume the same applies to the motion of our wills. God is necessarily good yet responsible, which disproves the idea that our actions must be free from necessity for us to be responsible. My Response #1 is correct, but let me add a bit more to avoid equivocation. Edwards is getting to the difference between agent and event causation. The two key concepts here are: the difference between acting a...

Outline of Edwards Arguments in part V.I Arminians say if something causally predetermines our choices, we are not responsible. But responsibility is not the cause of choices, it’s in the nature of choices If responsibility is in the cause of choices, we search through an infinite regression of causes, and nothing is ever responsible. My Response Point 1 is close, but not quite accurate. While our actions can be predetermined, our choices cannot be. Choice cannot be predetermined, else it’s not choice. Predeterminism leave us with only one possible action, but choice requires alternatives (i.e. more than one). A “predetermined choice” is self-contradictory, implying we can choose something we can’t choose. So we think Calvinists are inconsistent for saying we can choose. Also, Arminians agree that we are responsible for our choices. Even though we deny we are responsible for things we are causally predetermined to do, we are not saying responsibility lies in the cause of choices,...

Background - LFW and responsibility Under LFW, we are the causal source of our choices (i.e. nothing causally predetermines our choices); we are responsible for our choices. There’s nowhere else to go to. We can’t back track to something else - we are responsible. Under CFW, since our actions are causally predetermined, we can trace back the cause of our actions to something outside of us. Thus, we keep searching for the source of our actions to find out what’s ultimately responsible. When Calvinists say God is the ultimate source, we say they make God ultimately responsible for sin. Even if God establishes a system in which only secondary causes get punished and the primary cause does not (as Calvinists suppose), that doesn’t change the fact that God is ultimately responsible for sin. The issue isn’t one of God’s power or sovereignty, it’s a matter of His goodness and holiness. This is a classic Arminian argument, but Edwards attempts to turn the tables on Arminians, by arguing a...

Outline of Edwards’ arguments in part III.V Some falsely argue we can’t perform our spiritual duties, but desire these things, so they are excusable. This entails the contradiction that we are inclined and disinclined to the same thing Obedience consists in the inclination itself The inclination is itself the choice “Desire without performance” is a phrase sometimes used, but it's improper as the desire relates to something future or something else is the object of desire. (i.e. someone might say a drunk doesn't want to drink the drink he's drinking, meaning: a drunk who desires to avoid drinking “someday” so he can keep his money) This “indirect willingness” falls short of any virtue or even partial obedience to God’s command “Sincerity” in indirect willingness doesn’t make it any better, people can be sincerity about bad things. I already addressed the inconsistency between Edwards and modern Calvinists on the will here , but I wanted to address the argument itself. My...

Many Calvinists today think of free will as the ability to choose what we desire most. They view our strongest desire as the determining cause of choice. That doesn’t seem to be the way Edwards saw things. Edwards claims that reason, not desire determines choice. In places where I was expecting Edwards to say desire determines choice, I find Edwards saying reason determines choice. Whereas the modern Calvinist definition of choosing what we desire most concerns me as having too dim a view of reason and making our actions too similar to animal instincts, this is not a charge that applies to Edwards. Edwards view is simply different than modern Calvinists - he says reason determines choices, they say desire determines choices. A close reading of Edwards’ book about the will reveals that not only does he not say desire determines choice, he says reason determines choices. In fact, what Edwards says about desire rules out the idea that our choices are determined by our strongest desire. I...

Outline of Edwards’ Arguments in Part III.IV Commands inconsistent with LFW God commands the acts of the will, not the acts of body executing the will’s commands. If there’s a sequence of acts of the will, the first act that drives the train is the one God’s commands pertain to. Whatever comes before that first act of the will isn ’t the subject of the command. But some Arminians say the act of the soul determines the act of the will. So that act of the soul isn ’t subject to divine commands. Other Arminians say nothing causes the acts of the will, but then they happen by accident and pure chance. And if they happen by pure chance, there’s no point to God regulating them with a law. Inability and Responsibility Disobedience implies a moral inability to obey, because some moral cause must have determined the sin’s occurrence Natural inability is incompatible with responsibility if the will complies with a command, but the body is hindered, the man is excused Natural inability c...

In part 3, scections III.I , III.II , and III.III , Edwards argues against the link between LFW and responsibility by appealing to divine impeccability as well as judicial hardening. He argues if God cannot sin, and a hardened man cannot do good, neither has freewill. But God is still worthy of praise and the hardened sinner is still to blame. So praise and blame to not require freewill. The response is fairly straight forward. We agree that God cannot sin, and that sinners, without grace, cannot choose good. But does this mean that neither has LFW ? No. Recall that LFW does not mean the ability to choose between good and evil. ( link ) God chooses between good alternatives and sinners, without softening grace, choose between evil options. Divine Impeccability Imagine you dig $20 out of your couch cushion. With that $20 you could A) give it to church, or B) buy your mom flowers If you were impeccable, you could not C) buy drugs to get high. But you could still choose between th...

One of the many problems with the Calvinist arguments that LFW doesn’t exist is that if LFW doesn’t exist, God doesn’t have LFW. But scripture grants no quarter to those who claim that God doesn’t have LFW. The first verse in scripture claims that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. ( Genesis 1:1 ) We either understand this by faith, or we do not. ( Hebrews 11:3 ) Consider God’s first action. By definition, no act of God preceded that first act. So no causes preceded that action. Rather, God self-determined that action, by performing it. Thus, contrary to Calvinism, self-determining power exists. Now the Calvinist might object – how is this to be explained? Does it even make sense? But wait. The scripture says in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Atheists might doubt the existence of a first cause, but it is contrary to the faith to doubt that God created the world in the beginning. Perhaps the Calvinist might backpedal and say, yes God has self-d...

In part 2 section 12, Edwards attempts three demonstrations of the incompatibility of LFW and God’s foreknowledge: 1) based on the connection between foreknowledge and the event, 2) based on the impossibility of knowing things without evidence and 3) based on knowing a contingent event with certainty. The Connection between Foreknowledge and the Event Edwards' Argument: P1: Things in the past are now necessary P2: In the past, God infallibly foreknew our future choices C1: therefore, God's foreknowledge of our future choices is now necessary P3: if something necessary is infallibly connected with something else, that something else is also necessary P4: God's necessary foreknowledge is infallibly connected with our future choices C2: therefore, our future choices are necessary My Response P3 is equivical. "Connection" could mean either a logical connection or a causal one. Additionally, "is" can mean either a logical or a temporal moment. If connec...