Dan Chapa

Having identified the core grounding objection as 'how can counterfactual statements about a persons libertarian free will be true, given they do not actually make the choices in the real world?', we are now in a position to address it. In the first place, I am inclined to follow Job and proclaim if it is not he [God], then who is it? (Job 9:24). In other words God must in some ultimate sense ground middle knowledge; enabling counterfactual statements to be true. The chain has to start somewhere. God has libertarian free will; He can create multiple worlds but He actually created one. Given His omnipotence; I see no reason why He could not create multiple universes in multiple dimensions. God is distinct from His creation; He is not His creation. Further, God is distinct from possible creations. What we can do flows from what He can enable us to do. Middle knowledge corresponds to what we would choose, if God created multiple worlds or a different world than the one He did crea...

William Rowe's book asks the question: Can God be Free ? First, he gives an interesting historical introduction to the subject covering the views of Gottfried Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, Thomas Aquinas, and Jonathan Edwards; meanwhile he chimes in with his critique of their views from time to time. Then he discusses more recent treatments, such as Adams, Kretzmann, Howard-Snyder, Morris, Hasker, Wainwright, Langtry, Menssen, Wierenga, Flint, Swinburne, and Talbott. Rowe seems to hold that libertarian freedom is necessary for responsibility and he dismisses compatiblism as 'language gone on holiday'. Based on Leibniz's argument that God must have created the best of all possible worlds, Rowe argues a forking maneuver: either creation was necessary and God is not praiseworthy or God doesn't exist. Historic Overview Leibniz articulated two ideas that vital to the discussion. The first is the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), which states: there ought to be a reason why...