Dan Chapa

James Anderson was kind enough to share a chapter of an upcoming book he’s working on.  ( link )  The chapter is titled Calvinism and the First Sin and the book will be titled Calvinism and the Problem of Evil.  Dr. Anderson will remove the online version once the book is published, so read it while you can. Dr. Anderson addresses the challenges unique to Calvinism regarding the problem of evil including: 1) God’s determining the first sin makes Him the author of sin, 2) Calvinists must be compatiblists and there are some fairly strong arguments against compatibilism, and 3) and given Adam’s good nature, there’s no causal explanation for the first sin.  To his credit, Dr. Anderson openly embraces the idea that Calvinism is indeed divine determinism.  Now in true Van Tillian fashion, he spends a great deal of time explaining what this does not mean without elaborating on what it does mean.  Dr. Anderson argues that Calvinists need not be causal dete...

This post is a response to Scott Christensen’s article “Prevenient Grace and Semi-Pelagianism”. ( link ) One of the main aspects of Mr. Christensen’s article is calling Arminians Semi-Pelagian. Pelagius was a heretic condemned by the early church for teaching man does not need God’s grace to repent and believe. Semi-Pelagianism (a watered down form of Pelagianism which might be characterized as God helps those who help themselves) was likewise condemned by the early church. So calling someone Semi-Pelagian is serious and unwelcome. It’s the mirror image of calling someone a hyper-Calvinist. Both “Semi-Pelagian” and “hyper-Calvinist” are pejorative terms. Worse real Semi-Pelagians and hyper-Calvinists exist, so one does not want to get lumped in with those crowds. So this post will defend Arminianism from the charge by defining Semi-Pelagianism, addressing arguments that Total Depravity is undone by Prevenient Grace, that free will procures God’s grace, that Libertarian Free will acts...

This post will be an attempt to add some detail to earlier comments about problems reconciling Calvinism and total depravity, using John Hendryx post as an example ( here ). To my knowledge, it’s a new argument against Calvinism. Most Arminians are quick to agree with Calvinists on total depravity to avoid being called semi-Pelagian. However, this in my opinion is a mistake, not because Arminians disagree with total depravity, but because Calvinists have some definitional and consistency problems with affirming total depravity. Here's the basic argument: Premise 1: Per Calvinists, total depravity is a problem with man’s desires, it is a moral and spiritual problem. However, the depraved person is not physically or mentally handicapped or under coercion. The depraved still choose, they just always choose wrong when it comes to faith in Christ and pleasing God. Premise 2: Calvinists are compatible determinists. God’s decrees determines all things but we remain free in some sens...

Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner conducted a survey on free will. [i]   They argue these studies suggest that ordinary people’s pre-theoretical intuitions about free will and responsibility do not support incompatibilism.   It appears to be false—or certainly too hasty—to claim that ‘‘most ordinary persons. . . believe there is some kind of conflict between freedom and determinism’’ (Kane, 1999, p. 218 ).   In this post, I am going to dispute their interpretations of the results of their study.   The surveyors only present the results of a doubly revamped survey in their paper.   Of the first round they say: “ In some initial surveys we found that people do not understand the concept ‘determinism’ in the technical way philosophers use it. Rather, they tend to define ‘determinism’ in contrast with free will .” (565)   Likewise they report “ Examples of participants’ definitions of ‘determinism’ include: ‘‘Being unable...

1 Corinthians 10:13 states: No temptation has overtaken you except such as is common to man; but God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will also make the way of escape, that you may be able to bear it. Paul claims God's faithfulness in light of what some Jews did, such as grumble in the desert. Not all the Israelites fell into sin, but many did, even though God always provides His people with an exit path. That God does not allow unbearable temptations is a frank expression of His faithfulness. The application for Paul's audience and Christians generally is that every time we are tempted, God gives us the ability not to yield. Sadly we sometimes do give in to temptation, even though we are able to do otherwise.   Most people agree the Bible teaches libertarian free will without further ado.   But some, perhaps those from Missouri, need details, so this post attempts to provide argumentation that 1 Cori...

Turretinfan and I recently debated if the bible teaches libertarian free will.  I hope that you find it useful. Here was the format we used: Jeff: Introduction Dan (Affirmative) 15 min open T-Fan (Negative) 3 min cross ex of Dan T-Fan 15 min open Dan 3 min cross ex of T-Fan Dan 7 min rebuttal T-Fan 7 min rebuttal Dan 15 min cross ex of T-Fan T-Fan 15 min cross ex of Dan T-Fan 5 min conclusion. Dan 5 min conclusion. Jeff: Wrap up Many thanks to Turretinfan and Jeff for their time and efforts that went into this.  Here is a link to the MP3 file: link .

Traditionally, Libertarians have guarded the definition of free will very closely. Libertarians don't allow compatiblists to remove essential aspects from the concept of free will, like say, reducing ability to hypothetical ability. But while we maintain constant vigilance against compatibilist reductions to free will, it seems to me we are less aware of needless and harmful additions to the concept of free will; additions that may be just as damaging as compatibilist reductions. Both Arminians and Open Theists frequently use the term free will, but do we mean the same thing by it? Compatibilist reductions to free will are subtle; saying we are able to do otherwise, meaning we are able to do otherwise if we want to . Likewise, Open Theists may have subtle and dangerous additions to free will.

Certainty properly is not an affection of an existing thing or of one about to happen, but of the mind certainly knowing or foreknowing that the thing exists or is about to exist: whence a transference is made to the event, -for it is the same that a thing will happen, and that it will certainly happen, -but that it may be signified to another that there is no reason to doubt of the event coming to pass. But necessity is an affection of the being, and adds a mode to the event, by which it is said that a thing will happen necessarily, and is opposed to the mode which is called "contingency". Therefore the same idea is not expressed, when it is said that a thing will happen certainly and necessarily; for the one word is only about futurition, the other about the mode also of futurition. This necessity is that of the consequent, by which a thing exists from its antecedent beginning and cause, so that it cannot not-exist from it: to which is opposed the contingency of the consequ...

However, the action itself must not be counted among the things that are necessary for acting. This is evident per se, since otherwise one would not be asserting anything special about the causes under discussion; instead, one wold be making a claim that to all things - not only to all agents but to all entities as well- namely, that if they have a form whereby they are constituted with such and such an esse or under such an such a notion, then the consequent that they are of that sort follows necessarily. For just as if someone has whiteness, then he is necessarily white, so too if someone exercises an action, then he necessarily effects something-where this is merely the necessity of the consequence (as they say): that is, a conditioned necessity, and not the necessity of the consequent-that is, an absolute necessity. The former kind of necessity is irrelevant in the present context, since causes cannot be distinguished with respect to it. 1 Therefore, in order for the discussion to...

“When addressing the question of whether it is within one’s power to prevent some future event, it is important to keep clear that the distinction between the sensus divisus and the sensus composites. In sensu composito I cannot prevent a future event, for this is self-contradictory. But in sensu diviso I can prevent some future event, for I have contra-causal power to bring about future events. Similarly it is not within one’s power to postvent a past event in sensu composito because this is self-contaditory. Since backward causation is metaphysically impossible, we do not generally have it within our power to affect the past even is sensu division, thus generating our intuitions of the unalterability of the past as over against the future. But where what is past is conditioned by what is future (for example, future contingent propositions’ being antecedently true), I have the power to act in such a way that the past would have been different than it in fact was. (Craig. Divine Forekn...

“The second error has to do with the composed sense, namely, we should not claim that because the divine foreknowledge already exists beforehand, Peter is in reality not able not to sin, as if because of the preesisting divine knowledge he has lost something of his freedom and power not to sin in reality, should he so will. For I would not hesitate to call this sort of interpretation an error from the point of view of the faith. Indeed, even though that knowledge did exist beforehand, it was just as truly within his power not to sin as it would have been had that knowledge not existed, and he was just as truly able to refrain from the act in light of which he was foreknown to be a future sinner as he would have been had that knowledge not existed, as has been explained; thus this interpretation is not the one that the theologians have in mind. Rather, they are claiming, absolutely correctly, that given the divine foreknowledge, Peter is not able in the composed sense not to sin, becaus...

As an Arminian and Molinist, I specifically oppose all forms of causal determinism. If there’s one aspect of Calvinism I object to, it’s causal determinism. Yet some Calvinists are hesitant to say they are causal determinists. This post is to lay out the various forms of causal determinism; Naturalism, Occationalism, Concurrence and Mainline Calvinist Causal Determinism; all of which I oppose. Naturalism Based on knowledge derived from the physical and social sciences, the world view that is naturalism holds that human beings are fully included in nature. Science tells us that we are connected and united, in each and every aspect of our being, to the natural world. There is, under naturalism, nothing supernatural about us which places us above or beyond nature, but this is something to be celebrated, not feared. Practically speaking, naturalism holds that an individual’s development and behavior are entirely the result of prior and surrounding conditions, both genetic and environmental...