Dan Chapa

Recently I had separate conversations with Steve Hays and Turretinfan both of which got down to the charge that "you're using philosophical speculation, I am using scripture".  A serious charge, this; one wants his theology to be grounded in scripture rather than floating away via the levitating power of thin air. However, faith and reason are often intertwined; can you even trust scripture's words without trusting your eyes, ears and brain more than some philosophers are willing to do? We all have philosophies whether we are aware of them or not. My comments in blue; Steve and Turretinfan's comments in red. ------------------------------ http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2012/12/outside-camp.html Steve: Then I read a book by Jerry Walls and David Baggett which says my God could command people to torture little children for the fun of it. When I read that, it doesn’t hurt my feelings. It doesn’t offend me. But it does alienate me. It instantly dissolves an...

Steve Hays and I had a previous exchange on if 1 Corinthians 10:13 teaches libertarian free will or not.  ( link ) Regarding the question of if “no temptation has overtaken you then that which is common to man” is a general principle Paul is applying to a specific situation as I think or if as Steve thinks, Paul has only the temptation of idolatrous apostasy in mind, I doubt I can provide an answer that is beyond a reasonable doubt.  Still I think the language itself makes it more likely than not, that Paul is applying  a general rule.  After all, Paul says “no temptation” rather than the temptation of idolatrous apostasy.  I had said: Paul is applying a general principle to a specific situation, so even though idolatry is in view, that does not limit this wonderful promise that God, in His faithfulness, will not allow irresistible temptations. Steve Responded: In Arminianism, sufficient grace is resistible grace. So the “wonderful promise” is that God...

Steve Hays continues to question the way translators have rendered Deuteronomy 30:14.  ( link )  His primary reason seems to be the flexibility of the Hebrew, not some problem with the translators’ contextual analysis and selected rendering.  That’s like questioning most translations simply because they are translations.  I had said: Other translations render it “so that you may do it”. While may sometimes means permission as in “mother may I” or uncertainty, as in “it may rain”, neither of these senses make sense of the verse. It’s not as if God is now removing sanctions against morality, or guessing if they will obey or not. Rather, may is equivalent to “can” and expresses ability or capacity. Steve responded: "May" doesn't have the same nuance as "can." Agreed, but I already walked through why this usage of “may” expresses ability rather than uncertainty or permission.  You can’t destroy the building in front of you by saying buildings have to ...

1 Corinthians 10:13 states: No temptation has overtaken you except such as is common to man; but God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will also make the way of escape, that you may be able to bear it. In my recent debate, I argued: Paul's statement on God's faithfulness is in light of what some Jews did, such as grumble in the dessert.  Not all the Israelites fell into sin, but many did, even though God always provides His people with an exit path. That God does not allow unbearable temptations is a reflection on His faithfulness.   The implication for Paul's audience and for you, dear Christian, is that every time you go through a temptation, God gives you the ability not to succumb.  Sadly we sometimes do give in to temptation, even though we are able to do otherwise. Both Turretinfan and Steve Hays responded that the passage is only talking about ultimate apostasy and that true believers ...

Steve Hays recently launched a series of anti-Molinism arguments, mostly in response to William Lane Craig’s defense of Molinism here . Steve’s first criticism of Molinism is to call it fate and fatalistic, because in Molinism God does not decide what we would freely do in various circumstances.   ( link ) Steve doesn’t explain why this qualifies as fatalism.   Was the Cowboys selection of Tryon Smith fatalistic just because the first eight players were off the board?   No, just because you don’t decide everything does not mean you cannot decide anything or that the outcome of what you do choose is inevitable.   While God does not determine what we would choose in various circumstances, He does decide the circumstances.   Steve is confusing the inability to determine everything with the inability to determine anything. Steve’s second criticism of Molinsim is that “ So not only must God play the hand he’s been dealt, but he was dealt that hand from a fictit...

In Steve Hays' response to William Lane Craig ( here ), he raised some arguments against Molinism, which I have been attempting to address. This post is a continuation of our exchange. So the Molinist God instantiates a sinful world even though he hates sin, and sin is unnecessary. Doesn’t sound very coherent to me. Much less a promising theodicy. It’s no contradiction or incoherence to permit something you hate, so long as you have good reason to do so. I suppose one could read a contradiction into this by understanding 'instantiates' in some way that denies or undermines LFW. Yes, God is willing to permit sin to obtain the greater good. What’s the theodicean value of the adjective (“ultimately”) in relation to the noun (“sin”)? How does the adjective magically exculpate God on Molinist grounds? On Molinist grounds, ultimate responsibility is essential to moral culpability. Sometimes people are responsible for the downstream consequences of what they do when they are ulti...

Steve Hays and I have been discussing choice and determinism. However our last two posts have shown a significant increase in talking past each other rather then moving deeper into the topic. While I could give a line by line response, I would for the most part simply be repeating arguments I already presented. I am taking that as an indication that it's time to wrap things up (for now). My primary argument has been as follows: P1: The bible says we choose P2: Choosing rules out determinism C1: So the bible rules out determinism. P1 is plain in that every English translation of the terms bâcha and eklegomai as choose. Further, the concept of choice crosses linguistic barriers, because it describes something we all experience daily. It would take a conspiracy theory to even suggest that the meanings have shifted over time without scholars noting the change and translating bâcha and eklegomai differently. I supported p2 by citing multiple dictionaries which define choose as s...

This clip is a response to Steve on Frankfurt examples.

Paul’s final post contains somewhat of a summary of our debate, so I won’t respond point by point since that would just be repeating much of what has already been said. While I am not crying ‘straw man’ over his rundown of my argument, I do think it combines my initial argument with my responses to Paul’s statements on choose and determinism. Paul did bring up some new arguments about epistemology which I won’t address either since I doubt the relevance and I would have to do quite a bit of research– to his credit, Paul is much better read on these matters than I. Also, I won’t comment on the role of philosophy and scripture (since I said enough already), even though I actually consider that matter of greater importance than the LFW/determinism debate. The one area I will address is Paul’s definition of choose. Choose = df to select freely out of a greater number of things, where this selecting is a mental action explained in terms of reasons, where a reason is a purpose, end, or goal ...

Long ago I provide a list of scriptural passages that I thought taught freewill. ( link ) Turretinfan asked me: Why do any of the passages you cited, or the combination of passages, require anything more than a simple, Calvinistic free will? I asked him what is Calvinist free will, so I can respond? He said: “ Calvinistic free will simply says that a choice is a determination or judgment by an animate being with respect to one object in preference to another object. ” I responded: “Choice and preference can be synonyms, but to use a synonym to define its counterpart is somewhat bootstrapped.” ( link ) I didn’t consider the “thesaurus approach” precise enough and pushed for a more rigorous definition, which Turretinfan was somewhat reluctant to provide, in fear that it would obscure rather than clarify the issue. Turretinfan warned me that philosophy may just confuse things. ( link ) Gene Bridges said: we Calvinists have no burden of proof to prove "compatibilism," but ...

This post is in response to Paul's post " Choose the best " based on 2 Kings 10.

This youtube clip is a response to Paul Manata's post called some clean up . I want to be clear that I do think of Calvinists as brothers in the Lord.

This youtube clip is in response to Paul's post called kaput . The big picture is that Paul's recent dictionary definition put him where Steve was several months ago and likely this path would have similar results to my exhange with Steve (i.e. him saying here's why such and such squares with determinism and me saying here's why it does not).

Paul claims some libertarian philosophers deny PAP (Principle of Alternate Possibilities). He cites Timothy O' Connor, David Hunt and William Lane Craig. ( link ) This topic is somewhat tangential to our determinism/choose debate, but it's interesting so I thought I would address it. I tend to disagree with PAP but I also disagree with some of Craig's recent comments. I don't think O'Connor was denying PAP and I find Hunt's comments prima-facia inconsistent, so I will only address Craig. PAP and Frankfurt Examples PAP is the idea that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. (Free will Handbook. Fisher. Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatiblism. p283.) Note that not just some, but all events for which we are accountable must be free and not necessary under PAP. So for example those holding to PAP must deny we are morally accountable for our actions that result from prior free choices but are themselves not fr...

Paul seems to missunderstand my view on scripture. He states: Crucial to Dan’s argument is the claim that “common man” are all, each and every, libertarians. If Dan claims that some “common men” are not indeterminist, but determinist, then he defeats one of his premises, or makes the Bible speak in contradictions. To spell this point out, recall that Dan says, “The Bible is written by and to the common man, it means what they mean, since they mean certain words libertarianly, then the Bible so means those words.” Yet if we allow some (even one?) of the “common men” to whom the Bible was written to be determinists, then it must mean what they mean by the words that are the topic of our discussion. However, since there are indeterminist “common men”, then the Bible must also mean what they mean by the words we are discussing! Therefore, Dan must assume that each and every “common man” is a libertarian, which I find highly implausible. ( link ) It was not said what was said I said. The b...