Dan Chapa

Some Calvinists suggest that God's foreknowledge is based on His plan and/or knowledge of causal relations rather then based on the future. I thought I would look up what the church fathers had to say on the subject of God's foreknowledge and freewill. Here are the results. Diodore of Tarsus (circa 390) This text [Romans 8:29-30] does not take away our free will. It uses the word foreknew before predestined. Not it is clear that foreknowledge does not by itself impose any particular behavior. What is said here would be clearer if we started from the end and worked backwards. Whom did God glorify? Those whom he justified. Whom did he predestine? Those whom he foreknew, who were called according to his plan, i.e., who demonstrated that they were worthy to be called by his plan and made conformable to Christ. (Romans (Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture. New Testament, volume 6. Edited by Thomas Oden. P 235) Ambrosiaster (late 4th century) Those whom God foreknew would bel...

Steve has responded in our ongoing discussion on choice and determinism. Steve: I’ve been busy with more important business, such as my review of Ehrman’s silly new book. Thanks for responding to Ehrman's blasphemies. Steve: Moreover, I’ve already corrected him on his misstatement that determinism rules out possible alternatives. That’s demonstrably false. In supralapsarian Calvinism, for example, God chose a particular means to achieve a particular end. There were other possible ends, with corresponding means available to him, but he chooses the end that best furthers his purpose (i.e. the glorification of God in the glorification of the elect). Determinism does rule out possible alternatives. Calvinism isn't equivalant to determinism. Granted some Calvinists hold to exhaustive determinism - the ones who deny God's LFW. But Calvinists who affirm God's LFW deny exhaustive determinism. Granted, for these Calvinists, God not man has LFW. But to the extent that God has LF...

John Wagner recently edited and republished Daniel Whedon’s Freedom of the Will: A Wesleyan response to Jonathan Edwards . The book is an outstanding refutation of Edward’s Inquiry into the Will. Whedon seeks and engages top authors and arguments like Hobbs’ argument (latter adopted by Locke and Edwards) that free will is incoherent, because it either amounts to a causeless cause or infinite regression of causes. Whedon responds by pointing out 1) the will is the cause of choice (74), 2) defining indeterministic causes (38-39) and 3) explaining that indeterministic causes account for either choice (71-72). In other words, indeterministic causes explain the goal of our choices (or reason for our choices), but in the will is the cause we choose this goal, not that goal. This is essentially agent causation. Whedon’s discussion of foreknowledge is fascinating. His refutation of Edwards' God's foreknowledge rules out freewill argument is solid. I like his pointing out that we ...

Steve provided a response in our ongoing discussion of choice and determinism. For the most part, I agree with Steve's explanation of how dictionaries/lexicons work and only resist his characterizing my position as falling outside the parameters he so skillfully lays down. Paul and I reviewed 9 dictionary definitions of "choose". 8 of them use either "alternative" or "possible" or both within the definition. Wiktionary did not; it used synonyms (including "decide"). I cited this as a failing on the part of the Wiktionary and argued that the definitions provided in the other 8 dictionaries ruled out determinism. So my contention is that the question of why dictionaries and lexicons are what they are is not relevant to the business at hand. The questions should be: “what does the dictionary say” and “does that conflict with determinism”? Since dictionaries speak of possible alternatives and determinism rules out possible alternatives, it see...

In Keith Schooley's Article: Romans 9: An Arminian/New Perspective Reading, he skillfully uses the OT to explain Romans 9. Paul refutes " those Jews who would say that, if Paul’s gospel were correct, then “God’s word had failed” ( 9:6 ). His response to them is that God had never made the unconditional promises, based either on “works” or ethnicity, that they were claiming. God sovereignly chose Isaac over Ishmael; He sovereignly chose Jacob over Esau; and by implication, He can sovereignly choose on the basis of faith in Christ, as opposed to works of the law or ethnicity." Keith has an interesting take on hardening. Since both Pharaoh and God are said to harden Pharaoh's heart, Keith sees various roles in the hardening process. God provides the impetus for harding and Pharaoh responds by hardening his heart. Regerading the objector in Romans 9:19, Keith explains the objection as " the questioner is asking why faith in Christ should be necessary. That ...

Robert Hamilton’s commentary on Romans 9 generally fits under the category of “election of Nations”, but it contains several unique features worth mentioning. Hamilton considers God’s election of Israel as a form or particular prevenient grace, unconditionally dispensed solely at His discretion. This grace provides increased opportunities for salvation, but doesn’t actually save. God provides a general prevenient grace to all mankind, which is sufficient to enable faith, but He gives this particular prevenient grace only to some. Hamilton starts out with the introductory context of Romans 9, by explaining that the question in Romans 3:3 is essentially the same one in Romans 9:6. He also explains Romans 8:29-30 as corporate rather than individual election; an election that establishes the grounds on which the Body will be comprised in relation to the Head and the individual is considered as elect only insofar as they are considered united to Christ. In considering Romans 9:6 and 9:7...

Steve provided another post in our exchange on choice and determinism. Steve: a) A Calvinist doesn’t define the meaning of the word “choice” in terms “You can choose X if it’s your strongest desire.”b) For that matter, a Calvinist doesn’t even have to define the concept of choice in terms of “You can choose X if it’s your strongest desire.”The basic idea of choosing is simply to make a decision. I didn’t say Calvinists define choose as “You can choose X if it’s your strongest desire”, I said they avoid the common sense definitions and use exotic, philosophical counter-definitions; like the ones Paul provided. But Calvinists seem to have at least three options: 1) inconsistently hold to common sense definitions, 2) exotic, philosophical counter-definitions, or 3) use boiled down definitions that are missing some (or all) of the essential ingredients in the common sense definitions. If one removes enough essential elements of a definition, they end up with a tautology (choose = choose). ...